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1. Introduction 
 
Flexicurity – the contraction of the English words; Flexibility and Security – is currently the most 
popular concept for employment and labour market reforms in the European Union. This is clearly 
testified in the March 2006 Presidency conclusions of the European Union that calls for the member 
states to pursue reforms in labour market and social policies under an integrated flexicurity ap-
proach, and commits the European Commission to establish a common set of principles on flexicu-
rity. According to the European Council the benefits of such a flexicurity approach are improved 
adaptability of workers and enterprises, more open and responsive labour markets, more productive 
workplaces, and positive interdependencies of competitiveness, employment and social security 
(Council of the European Union, Brussels, 18 may 2006; p. 13).  
 
In recent years, Denmark has become the prime example of a real-life flexicurity labour market. 
The Danish case of flexicurity is a combination a flexible labour market with liberal hiring-and-
firing procedures on the one hand, and relatively generous social security and active labour market 
policies on the other hand. In general terms, Denmark has succeeded in combining a universal, gen-
erous and redistributive welfare state with a competitive labour market and productive labour force. 
The recent international academic and political interest in this “happy marriage” of flexibility and 
security – or the “golden triangle” as it is sometimes labelled - coincides with relatively good 
macro-economic and labour market performance (Madsen 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006; Bredgaard et al 
2005, 2006). The most important implication of Danish flexicurity is a shift from job security to-
wards employment security (Wilthagen 1998; Wilthagen & Tros 2004), i.e. protecting transitions on 
the labour market rather than protecting jobs. 
 
In this report we will compare what seem to be two completely different cases of flexicurity; the 
Danish and the Japanese case. Traditionally, the Japanese labour market model has been character-
ised by the practice of life-time employment for the regular workforce, consensual labour-
management relations, and high working-time and functional flexibility within large internal labour 
markets (Kato 2001; Passet 2003). In the 1980s, the Japanese production and employment system 
was held up as a ‘best practice’ and model which the European community could learn from, par-
ticularly by combining job security with a high degree of (internal) flexibility. However, the burst 
of the so-called “bubble economy” in the 1990s, and the recession and stagflation following in its 
wake, has put Japan under pressure for employment reforms (Passet 2003).  
 
Despite improvements in recent years, the employment situation is still considered as being difficult 
(JILPT 2006). The Japanese problem definition focuses on unemployment (especially among young 
people) and the increase in the number of non-regular workers creating disparities in economic op-
portunities. During an economic crisis there are also strong pressures for increasing flexibilities 
within internal labour markets (like working time reductions, wage cuts, and changes of task and 
duties within the organisation) and the (internal) social security system comes under pressure. This 
is indicated by a high feeling of job-insecurity even among people in regular employment (Passet 
2003, Boyer 2006). On top of this Japan has to deal with the problems of an ageing society, which 
create a need for a higher employment-rate (especially for women) and a higher involvement of the 
high proportion of young people outside regular employment.   
 
The main question of this report is whether a new balance between flexibility and security could be 
a viable solution for reforming the Japanese employment system. Especially contrasted to the Dan-
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ish flexicurity-model with external numerical flexibility, external (public) social security and less 
employment protection legislation (EPL).  
 
In the next section we will define and discuss our analytical framework; the concept of flexicurity 
(section 2). Then we proceed by describing the Danish case of flexicurity, and its social and institu-
tional preconditions (section 3). Then we provide a fresh account of the Japanese employment sys-
tem and labour market model by applying the main concepts from the flexicurity literature (section 
4). In section 5 we conclude on the relevance of contrasting the Danish model of flexicurity to the 
Japanese labour market, and describe the possible policy implications.  
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2. The flexicurity framework 
 
In this section we will explore the concept of flexicurity and describe how various understandings 
of it coexist (as political strategy, a certain state of affairs, and an analytical concept), and how it is 
possible to mix forms of flexibility and security into different combinations.  
 
It should be noted that the idea of flexicurity is relatively new, both as a political strategy and as a 
research area. To put it bluntly, economists have often tended to take a one-sided view of the posi-
tive consequences of flexibility for labour markets, enterprises and employees, and have tended to 
see social and employment security as barriers to competitiveness and economic growth. On the 
other hand, labour market and social policy researchers (e.g. political scientists and sociologists) 
have usually focused more on the positive consequences of security for redistribution and welfare, 
but have rarely taken into account its consequences for the flexibility of the labour market or enter-
prises.  
 
The fundamental idea of the flexicurity concept is that flexibility and security are not contradictory, 
but mutually supportive. Critics have said that flexicurity is really nothing more than a paraphrase 
of the traditional antagonism between capital and workers; employers demanding more flexibility 
and employees demanding more security as compensation (cf. Ozaki 1999). However, the idea be-
hind the flexicurity approach is that flexibility is not the monopoly of the employers, just as security 
is not the monopoly of the employees. In modern labour markets, employers are realising that they 
have an interest in stable employment relations and in retaining employees who are loyal and well-
qualified (thereby recouping human capital investments). On their part, many employees are reali-
sing that to be able to adjust their work life to more individual preferences they too have an interest 
in more flexible ways of organising work, e.g. to balance work and family life (Wilthagen and Tros 
2004). So, the foundation is there for a new interaction between flexibility and security.2    
 
While flexicurity was first coined as a concept in the Netherlands to describe a particular piece of 
legislation on labour regulation, the concept has also increasingly been used to describe the Danish 
labour market model as a combination of liberal employment protection legislation, high social 
security, and extensive active labour market programs. In several reports, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) has pointed to Denmark as a good example (Auer 2000; Auer and Casez 2003; 
Egger and Sengenberger 2003), and the OECD has repeatedly mentioned the Danish combination of 
                                                 
2
 As an empirical concept, the phrase flexicurity was first coined in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s. Holland had a 
restrictive system for dismissal of permanent employees. Employers had to ask for permission to dismiss workers either 
from the local Centres for Work and Income or the local courts; furthermore employers are partly responsible for fi-
nancing the unemployment and disability benefit systems through social contributions. Permanent full-time employees 
were covered by relatively high job protection, which induced enterprises to increase flexibility in the workforce by 
hiring groups of temporary workers on fixed-term contracts (flexibility at the margins). Generally these “atypical” 
workers had a lower level of social security (e.g. rights to unemployment benefit, pensions and holidays) and a lower 
level of job security than permanent full-time staff. The idea of the Dutch flexicurity legislation, which took effect in 
1999, was to correct this imbalance between an inflexible labour market for core workers and an insecure labour market 
situation for the contingency workforce. The protection against dismissal for permanent workers was modified, the 
system requiring permits for temporary work agency was abolished, and the job protection of atypical employees was 
strengthened. Another important aim was to encourage a development from job security towards employment security, 
in particular through a more active labour market policy.  The inspiration for this legislation came partly from a collec-
tive labour agreement between the employers, the trade unions and the temp agency START from 1993, partly from an 
agreement in the ’Labour Foundation’, which is a central body for consultation between employers’ organisations, trade 
unions and the government. The Dutch legislation on flexicurity is therefore a typical example of the tradition for cor-
poratist coordination (Wilthagen 1998; Wilthagen & Tros 2004). 
 5 
a flexible labour market and high social security as a best practice (e.g. OECD 2004: Chapter 2). 
Recently, the European Commission has embraced the concept of flexicurity, most evidently in the 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council stating that the member states should pursue re-
forms in labour market and social policies under an integrated flexicurity-approach, while the 
Commission will explore the development of a common set of principles on flexicurity (Council of 
the European Union, may 18, 2006, p. 12).3  
 
One important reason for the increasing popularity of the concept is probably the very fact that the 
concept is so hard to define, and consequently different actors can mould the concept to fit their 
own interpretations and interests. Here lies one possible explanation as to why flexicurity has be-
come a semantic magnet to which the EU Commission and the OECD, for example, have found 
themselves attracted. This lack of conceptualization and concretization implies a certain political 
ambiguity and timidity.4  
 
2.1. Defining flexicurity      
 
In the literature, at least three different – but overlapping – understandings of flexicurity can be 
identified: flexicurity as a policy strategy, as a state of affairs on the labour market, and as an ana-
lytical concept. One possibility is to define flexicurity as ”social protection for flexible work forces” 
(cf. Klammer & Tillman 2001; Ferrera et al. 2001) or as the “normalization of atypical work” 
(Wilthagen 2005). The most precise and probably the most widely used definition of flexicurity 
come from Ton Wilthagen and his colleagues. Wilthagen defines the concept as a policy strategy:  
 
“…that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour mar-
kets, work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employ-
ment security and social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside the labour market, on 
the other hand” (cf. Wilthagen 1998; Wilthagen & Rogowski 2002; Wilthagen & Tros 2004).  
 
In order to obtain the label ‘flexicurity’, the strategy, policy or program must be synchronous (con-
tain elements of both flexibility and security at the same time), deliberate (the actors must be con-
scious about this mutuality) and aimed at vulnerable groups (people on the margins of or outside the 
labour market).  
 
A second definition of flexicurity has subsequently been developed to include a certain state of af-
fairs or condition on the labour market, more precisely:  
 
“(1) a degree of job, employment, income and ‘combination’ security that facilitates the labour 
market careers and biographies of workers with a relatively weak position and allows for enduring 
and high quality labour market participation and social inclusion, while at the same time providing 
(2) a degree of numerical (both external and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows 
for labour markets’ (and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing con-
ditions in order to enhance competitiveness and productivity” (Wilthagen & Tros 2004: 170).  
 
                                                 
3
 In the 2006 edition of Employment in Europe the European Commission has devoted a chapter to analysing flexibility 
and security in the EU labour markets. 
4
 As Jean-Claude Barbier concludes about the political use: “No political document published by the Commission or the 
OECD has – so far – been able to present a coherent, comprehensive and detailed economic model of a ”nexus” be-
tween flexibility and security” (Barbier 2006). 
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This definition is among other things inspired by the Danish case, where it is difficult to speak of 
any deliberate policy strategy. 
 
The third understanding of flexicurity is as an analytical framework that can be used to analyse 
developments in flexibility and security and compare national labour market systems. One impor-
tant insight from Wilthagen and his colleagues is that both flexibility and security are multi-
dimensional concepts. Taking a point of departure in Atkinson’s well-known model of the flexible 
firm (Atkinson 1985, Atkinson and Meager 1986), a distinction can be made between four forms of 
flexibility: (1) Numerical flexibility (adaptation of the number of employees), (2) functional flexi-
bility (between different work tasks), (3) working time flexibility and (4) wage flexibility. The in-
novative aspect of the flexicurity concept is to link this with different forms of security: (1) Job 
security: security enabling the worker to remain in the same job. (2) Employment security: security 
to remain in employment, but not necessarily in the same job or with the same employer. (3) In-
come/social security: security which maintains one’s income under conditions of unemployment, 
illness and accident. And (4) combination security: the possibility to combine working life with 
private life (e.g. child-care leave). 
 
With this point of departure, the possibilities of combining flexibility and security are often pre-
sented in a matrix showing several possible combinations (cf. Wilthagen & Tros 2004): 
 
Figure1: The flexicurity matrix 
 
 Job security  Employment 
security  
Income security  Combination 
security  
Numerical flexibility      
Working time flexi-
bility   
    
Functional flexibility      
Wage flexibility 
 
    
 
Wilthagen’s matrix offers a heuristic tool which can be used to identify different flexicurity policies 
or combinations of flexibility and security for certain arrangements. It can also be used to identify 
relationships between flexibility and security in different national labour market regimes. Other 
dimensions of the concept concern the level (national, regional, local or individual) and the range of 
coverage of different groups and sectors (the entire labour market, sectors, job types or groups). 
Finally, flexicurity arrangements can be established through different forms of regulation: law, col-
lective agreements or individual work contracts. Interpreted this way, flexicurity is a complex and 
multi-dimensional concept that implies integration of different policy fields. Flexicurity arrange-
ments are embedded in broader national contexts (welfare state models, collective bargaining sys-
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tems, national traditions), just as there are many different forms of flexicurity both in Europe and 
within individual countries.5 
 
2.2. Identifying flexicurity 
 
Here we also hint at one of the weaknesses of the flexicurity matrix: the fact that it is used both to 
identify national labour market regimes and specific arrangements (programs, instruments, 
schemes) at different levels. It would not be difficult to imagine forms of flexicurity at the firm, 
branch or sector level which will be in conflict with (or counterproductive for) national flexicurity 
configurations. There can be contradictions between security arrangements provided by the firm 
(which will tend to promote job security and thereby functional and working time flexibility), and 
security arrangements provided by the state (which will tend toward promoting employment secu-
rity and thereby external numerical mobility). In this way, we may lose the perspective of the dy-
namics which exist between different types of flexicurity arrangements at different levels.  
 
Our approach to this problem is to apply the matrix to identify relationships between flexibility and 
security in different national labour market regimes. With this point of departure, more explanatory 
or deeper factors behind  the description of regimes can be explicated so as to show the significance 
of arrangements with different forms of regulation (law, contract-based, public services, etc.), levels 
(regionally, locally or individually) and locations (the entire labour market, sectors, job types, 
groups, etc.). Added to this is the entire understanding of the necessary social conditions, the impor-
tance of which has been emphasized by Barbier (2006). We must therefore ask: Why and how have 
the established arrangements emerged (by negotiations, compromises or redistribution of re-
sources)? What are the conditions for future arrangements? The institutionalisation of policies 
seems just as important as the specific policy strategy or design (Larsen 2005). 
 
Another weakness with both the definition and the matrix has been pointed out by Leschke, Schmid 
and Griga (Leschke et al. 2006). The juxtaposition of different forms of security and flexibility as a 
trade-off tend to neglect the more general positive effects beyond the ‘marriage’ between the indi-
vidual forms. The flexibility gains of employers does not necessarily mean a loss of security among 
employees; and security gains of employees does not necessarily mean flexibility losses of employ-
ers. The flexicurity nexus can also reflect a mutually supportive or complementary relationship; e.g. 
job security can induce employees to be loyal to the employer and to invest in firm-specific human 
capital, thereby increasing functional flexibility, as in the Japanese case. Alternatively, in the Dan-
ish case, where high income and employment security give people greater willingness to take risks, 
                                                 
5
 As an analytical frame, flexicurity is closely related to another popular labour market concept, the idea of the Transi-
tional Labour Markets, TLM (Schmid & Gazier 2002). The basic assumption in the TLM approach is that the bounda-
ries between the labour market and various social systems (such as the educational system, the unemployment system, 
pension system, private households) must become more open towards transitional states between paid employment and 
productive activities outside the market.  The aim is a new form of full employment, which is different from (male) full-
time, life-time employment with the same employer, but is instead a “floating equilibrium” of a 30-hour working week 
over a lifetime, for both men and women. That is, a development from job security to employment security similar to 
the ideas behind the flexicurity concept. In this context flexicurity is seen as an implementation strategy – or even as the 
end goal – for a TLM labour market, as it is assumed that the transitions between the labour market and other social 
systems will only be possible if adequate security is provided for the individual (Schmid & Schömann, 2004). “Good 
transitions” are regarded as temporary stepping stones for the individual, which may lead to social inclusion, and which 
secure productivity and competitiveness for employers (cf. also Bredgaard & Larsen 2006).   
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and thereby also greater desire for job change and job retraining, which again ensures higher job 
mobility and a more skilled labour force. But the nexus can also be vicious; e.g. when hire and fire 
policies lead to high insecurity, under-investments in human capital, lower effective demand, and 
even lower fertility rates (Leschke et. al 2006: 3). Lesche et. al (2006) proposes to identify empiri-
cal outcomes between flexibility and security as complementary, vicious or trade-offs. 
 
2.3. Why compare Denmark and Japan? 
 
There have been – and still are - major differences between the Japanese and Danish labour market 
model, which should be taken as a starting point for our research. The Danish employment system 
is oriented towards the external labour market (with low job protection and high numerical flexibil-
ity combined with public income and employment security). Traditionally, the Japanese employ-
ment system has been oriented towards the internal labour market, where life-time employment was 
combined with internal flexibility, especially for the core workforce. These different start-points are 
illustrated in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2: Idealised combinations of flexibility and security in Japan and Denmark 
 
 Internal security External security 
 
Internal flexibility Japan 
 
 
External flexibility  Denmark 
 
 
Internal flexibility comprises the types of flexibilities managed on internal labour markets. In this 
case; (1) working time flexibility (overtime, short-time, and part-time work), (2) functional flexibil-
ity (internal job changes, transfers, change of functions and tasks, flexible work organisation, and 
on-the-job learning), and (3) wage flexibility (pay systems, bonuses, outsourcing). External flexibil-
ity refers to numerical flexibility on the external labour market (external job changes, temporary 
layoffs, fixed term contracts, temp agency work, atypical employment etc.). Internal security refers 
to the securities managed and provided by employers and corporations in internal labour markets. 
This is typically expressed as job security (like employment protection for permanent and atypical 
workers, including procedures for dismissal, notice period, severance pay), but it may also include 
income/social security of the employer and corporations and combination securities (like company 
leave policies). Finally, external security refers the type of securities managed and financed by the 
state government (the public budget) like active labour market policies, public funded income and 
social security.      
 
In this report we describe the traditional and as well as current balance of flexibility and security in 
Denmark and Japan. While the Danish labour market model has repeatedly been analysed as a 
(best) case of flexicurity, the Japanese case has not so far been explicitly interpreted as a case of 
flexicurity, and the concept seems to provide an adequate and systematic description of some fun-
damental characteristics of both labour market models, and possible routes to follow in the future. 
In the following we begin by describing the main elements of the Danish case of flexicurity and the 
possibilities for policy transfer and learning. Then we proceed to analyse the Japanese case of 
flexicurity; the traditional combination of job security and internal flexibility in life-time employ-
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ment, the current challenges of the labour market model, and suggestions for possible reform paths 
to take.  
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3. The Danish case of flexicurity 
 
The period since the mid-1990s has been a ‘golden age’ for the Danish labour market. This is often 
referred to as the Danish ‘job miracle’ (Cox 1998, Torfing 2004), which made commentators won-
der whether Denmark had realised the “inflation-free growth economy at full employment” (Madsen 
1999). It has turned out to be possible to achieve low unemployment6 without the attendant prob-
lems of wage increases and inflation, while at the same time maintaining important welfare ar-
rangements, despite significant pressure. In the most recent European survey, the employment rate 
in Denmark ranks as the highest in the European Union: In 2004, 75.7% of persons aged 15-64 
years were in employment in Denmark (compare to 63.3% in EU25 and 68.7% in Japan). From 
having previously considered high and persistent unemployment an almost chronic state, Denmark 
is now close to full employment, according to several commentators. There are reports of increasing 
labour shortages and warnings that the labour market is close to full capacity utilisation. Like in 
Japan, the key political agenda is to increase effective labour supply and counter the demographic 
challenge of a shrinking and ageing workforce (the Welfare Commission 2006). 
 
Recently, these favourable labour market outcomes have been ascribed to the unique Danish com-
bination of flexibility and security. The combination of well-managed macroeconomic policies, 
labour market reforms, high flexibility, a well-educated workforce and well-functioning tripartite 
cooperation based on social and political consensus has won the “Danish labour market model” 
renown. In several reports, the UN’s international labour organisation, ILO, has pointed out Den-
mark as a shining example (Auer, 2000; Auer & Casez, 2003; Egger & Sengenberger, 2003).  In 
connection with the EU employment strategy, and in individual EU members such as Germany and 
France, Denmark has been used as a textbook example of how a member state has proved able to 
combine a dynamic economy, high employment and social security. In the international debate on 
“flexicurity” - or ways of combining flexibility in the labour market with social and employment 
security - the Danish case is quoted frequently (Wilthagen 1998; Wilthagen & Tros 2004; Madsen, 
2003, 2004; OECD, 2004, chapter 2).  
 
The Nordic countries are counterevidence to the common assumption that high taxation is detrimen-
tal to competitiveness and economic prosperity. Denmark was in 2005 ranked as the best place in 
the world to conduct business over the next five years despite emerging labour shortages, the high 
level of public spending and taxation, and xenophobic anti-immigration policies (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2005). In recent years the Nordic countries have, despite high tax rates, consis-
tently been at the top of the World Economic Forum’s growth competitiveness index (World Eco-
nomic Forum 2005, 2006). 
 
3.1. The “golden” triangle 
 
The Danish combination of flexibility and security is often described as a ‘golden triangle’ (see 
Figure 3 below). Danish flexicurity combines high mobility between jobs with a comprehensive 
social safety net for the unemployed and an active labour market policy. In fact the mobility (meas-
ured by job mobility, job creation, job destruction and average tenure) is remarkable high by inter-
national comparisons (Bingley et al. 2000; Auer and Cazes 2003; Madsen 2005). Since the early 
1980s, where data are available, the number of job creations and job destructions amount to on av-
                                                 
6
 Following the national Danish unemployment registers, unemployment reached a record low at 3.9% of the workforce 
(equivalent to 107.000 full-time persons) in December 2006, which is the lowest level recorded since oil crises hit west-
ern economies in the early 1970s.  
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erage 10 percent of all jobs being created or destructed every year, and around one third of the la-
bour force being newly recruited or dismissed within the last year (Ministry of Employment 2005; 
Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd 2004). Another indicator of numerical flexibility is the average 
tenure with the same employer (cf. Auer & Cazes 2003). Denmark is among a group of countries 
with a rather low tenure (around 8.5 years in 2005), comparable to the United Kingdom. In contrast, 
the average tenure of 12 years in Japan in year 2000 is almost 50% higher than in Denmark (Auer 
2006). As a final indicator the average number of jobs held per worker in Denmark is the highest in 
EU-25; almost 6 jobs in Denmark, compared to 4 jobs on average in EU-25. More than 70% of 
people in Denmark think that changing jobs every few years is good; compared to 40% in EU-25 
(European Foundation 2005). 
 
The high degree of mobility from employer to employer is probably linked to the relatively modest 
level of job protection. Low job protection is consistent with the Danish industrial structure, with its 
predominance of small and medium-sized enterprises (i.e. small internal labour markets). And it is 
also is in line with the long liberal tradition of the Danish welfare state (Madsen 1999, 2005), 
which, among other things, is attributable to the tradition whereby the social partners have been left 
to regulate most of the terms and conditions important to the labour market themselves, as opposed 
to the state regulation found in other countries. So, an important precondition for this Danish labour 
market model is a tradition for corporatist labour market regulation (Andersen and Mailand 2005). 
Another reason for the high job mobility could also be a greater willingness to take risks among 
workers as a result of the comprehensive social safety net. Despite one of the lowest levels of job 
protection among OECD countries (OECD 2004; Madsen 2005), there is a feeling of high job secu-
rity among all subgroups of Danish workers (OECD 1997; Auer and Casez 2003; Auer 2006).  
 
Figure 3: The “Golden” Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flexible 
labour 
market 
Generous 
social 
security 
Active 
labour 
market 
policy 
The main bal-
ance between 
flexibility and 
security 
Motivation effect 
Qualification effect 
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In Figure 3 (above) the arrows between the corners of the triangle illustrate flows of people. Even if 
the unemployment rate is low by international standards, Denmark has a near European record in 
the percentage of employed who are each year affected by unemployment and receive unemploy-
ment benefits or social assistance (around 20%). But the majority of these unemployed persons 
manage to find their own way back into a new job.7 Those who become long-term unemployed end 
up in the target group for the active labour market policy, which – ideally – assist them in finding 
employment again. The figure illustrates two of the most important effects in this connection. On 
the one hand, as a result of the active labour market measures, the skills of participants in various 
programs (e.g. job training and education) are upgraded and this improves their chances of getting a 
job. On the other hand, the measures can have a motivational effect in that unemployed persons 
who are approaching the time when they are due for activation may intensify their search for ordi-
nary jobs, in the event that they consider activation a negative prospect. 
 
The social security system in the form of unemployment benefits and social assistance for the un-
employed together with the highly flexible labour market form the main axis of the model, in the 
sense that both elements have been characteristic of the Danish labour market for many years. Rec-
ognition of the employers’ right to hire and fire at will dates back to the September Compromise of 
1899 when the labour market organisations (the employers association and trade union movement) 
entered into an agreement that focused on labour market disputes and how to solve them, as well as 
the appropriate role of organisations in the system. This established centralised negotiations and 
mechanisms for resolving disputes and also laid the foundation for the practice of self-regulation by 
labour market parties in most matters of importance to the labour market (Larsen & Jørgensen 
2002).  
 
As in Finland and Sweden, the Danish unemployment benefit system is based on the Ghent system. 
It has its roots in the early 1900s, and in its present form dates from the late 1960s. A generous (by 
international standards) and primarily government-financed benefit support system was established 
in 1969 and fairly wide frameworks for support were adopted. The unemployment benefit system is 
administered not by the state, but by the independent unemployment insurance funds (ar-
bejdsløshedskasserne) which are de facto affiliated to the trade unions. Unemployment benefits and 
the government’s role in financing them were increased, eligibility requirements for insurance and 
unemployment benefits were eased, and high levels of compensation for lost income were secured. 
In return, employers were exempted from compensating redundant employees, as this responsibility 
was taken over by the state. Consequently, employers have never had to guarantee employment and 
pay for redundancies, and the hiring and firing costs of Danish businesses have remained very low 
(Bredgaard et. al 2005).  
 
On the other hand, the active labour market policy with its emphasis on upgrading skills and job 
training is relatively new. In its present form, it originates in the labour market reform of 1993-94 
and subsequent initiatives. The labour market reform of 1994 marked a significant shift, from a 
                                                 
7
 Despite the long duration (4 years) and generosity (up to 90% replacement rate) of the Danish unemployment benefit 
system; there is a relatively low incidence of long-term unemployment. As an indication, the proportion of unemployed 
who experienced unemployment for more than 6 months in 2005 was 44% and the proportion experiencing unemploy-
ment for more than 12 months was 26%. The corresponding figures for EU-15 were 61% and 44% respectively. The 
incidence of long-term unemployment in Japan is placed in between Denmark and the EU-15 average: Around 50% of 
the unemployed experience unemployment for more than 6 months, and around 33% for more than 12 months (OECD 
2006: 267). 
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passive to an active labour market and social policy. In this case, the trade unions in particular had 
to make concessions, by accepting a decrease in the period of eligibility for unemployment benefits, 
and, not least, losing the right to regain eligibility by participating in activation measures. In return, 
an individually tailored activation policy was supposed to increase the chances of the unemployed 
individual to return to employment. It could be argued that the trade unions thus accepted that the 
shift away from lifelong income security to a higher degree of employment security, the latter com-
bined with motivational elements such as tightening the rules for work availability and the duty of 
activation (Madsen 1999, 2005; Larsen & Jørgensen 2002; Bredgaard et. al 2006). 
 
Besides the employment security provided by an active labour market policy, an important role in 
the functioning of Danish flexicurity is played by education policy (Lassen 2002). Again, the social 
partners are highly involved and institutionally committed to the planning and implementation of 
education policies, in particular continuing vocational training (CVT) policies. A specific institu-
tional characteristic of the Danish CVT policy is that it provides services and training for both the 
employed and the unemployed. Under the formal responsibility of the Ministry of Labour (now 
Ministry of Education) but administered by the social partners, continuing vocational training of 
unskilled workers was established in 1960, and a similar system was established for skilled workers 
in 1965. Even if the social partners plan and administer the CVT system, the state is its main fi-
nancer, just as is the case with the unemployment benefit system. This financing system externalises 
the costs of training and education from the firms, and indirectly serves as a government subsidy to 
the competitiveness of Danish industry. Partly as a result of this financing arrangement and the ex-
tensive rights of participation in CVT, Denmark has for a number of years ranked among the top 
performers in Europe in relation to participation in CVT activities (Eurostat 2005; OECD 2005). 
Since the CVT system is predominantly financed by the public budget, CVT activities are more 
likely to provide general rather than firm-specific skills, which are transferable on the external la-
bour market. Also, by allowing unemployed workers to improve their general skills during eco-
nomic downturns, firms are in a better position to compete once the economy improves (Campbell 
and Pedersen 2005). 
 
In sum, the development of the Danish welfare state and labour market points towards an interesting 
hybrid between the flexible, liberal welfare states characterised by high numerical flexibility (liberal 
hiring-and-firing rules) and the generous Scandinavian welfare regimes of high social security (rela-
tively high benefit levels) (Madsen 1999, 2003, 2005, 2006). The hybrid model manages to recon-
cile the dynamic forces of the free market economy with the social security of the Scandinavian 
welfare states. Some writers may be inclined to call this hybrid unstable and bound eventually to 
head off in one or the other of the two directions (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, it is evident 
that this hybrid model is a result of a long evolutionary development, and is supported by relatively 
stable institutions and class compromises. 
 
Even though the term flexicurity is new, it is in fact only trying to describe and rephrase some deep-
rooted characteristics of the Danish labour market. Therefore the causalities involved are complex 
and must be understood as mutual interrelations with a strong element of path dependency. The 
positive outcomes of the Danish model are not just related to a simple causality from, for instance, a 
low level of employment protection to economic success. Without the security elements, which 
support the willingness to accept structural change and risk-taking both by employees and employ-
ers, the Danish model would probably not have been able to achieve its current level of employment 
and competitiveness. Another important factor is the successful balancing of the macroeconomic 
policy and trends in the global economy. Managing to keep inflation low during an economic boom 
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must also be attributed to the emergence of a new agenda for collective bargaining and wage forma-
tion, which meant that the labour market was able to adjust to the shift from high unemployment to 
high employment and still keep wage increases at a moderate pace, which in turn meant that the 
Danish economy did not stray from the international shift towards low inflation (Bredgaard et al. 
2005, 2006). 
 
One important challenge of Danish flexicurity is to include everyone capable on the labour market. 
The large number of job changes means that individual workers are repeatedly being tested for their 
productivity and work potential. This constant selection process leads to some groups of employees 
being gradually excluded from the labour market if they fail to live up to the expectations of em-
ployers. A large group of workers are thus more or less permanently balancing on the edge of the 
labour market or outside it. The price for a highly efficient and mobile labour market with an exten-
sive safety net might be that a large part of the potentially active population of working age is 
gradually excluded from the labour market and become welfare recipients. The composition of the 
group of people on transfer income has changed considerably. Immigrants from third-world coun-
tries make up a growing share of social assistance recipients; they have considerably lower em-
ployment and participation rates than ethnic Danes, and this constitutes a major and so far unre-
solved integration and labour market problem.   
 
3.2. Learning from Denmark? 
 
Danish flexicurity is not the result of a deliberate plan carried out over a short period in the 1990s. 
Essential parts of the model date way back to the September Compromise in 1899 and to welfare 
reforms in the 1960s. It is these specific historical conditions that make it difficult to transfer Dan-
ish experiences directly to other contexts. An important message, though, is that imposing strong 
restrictions on the freedom of employers to hire and fire employees is not the only way to provide 
security for the individual in the labour market. Quite the contrary, it is possible to combine a dy-
namic labour market with a high degree of income and social security.  
 
The booming literature on policy transfer and Europeanisation illustrates the options for, but also 
the barriers to, policy learning either directly from neighbours or from policies advocated by supra-
national bodies like the European Union (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Olsen 2001). Inspired by 
Vivien Smith (2002) one can list a number of factors, which determine the transferability of policies 
into a given country. These include its economic vulnerability exemplified by presence or absence 
of economic crisis and the political institutional capacity, which is inherent in the principal policy 
actors’ ability to impose or negotiate change. Important factors are also policy legacies and prefer-
ences, which determine the ‘fit’ of potential policies with longstanding policies and institutions and 
with existing preferences. Related to the latter is also the flexibility or robustness of the national 
policy discourse, determining the ability to change preferences by altering perceptions of, for in-
stance, economic vulnerabilities and policy legacies.  
 
With direct reference to the transferability of flexicurity policies, Wilthagen (2005: 265) has also 
stressed the importance of political institutional capacity in the form of mutual trust between the 
social partners and the government, when it comes to developing flexicurity policies. Adequate 
central and de-central level platforms and channels for coordination, consultation and negotiation 
are also highly important.  
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The importance of these points is of course related to the core of the flexicurity concept: moving 
from one configuration of levels of flexibility and security to another will involve one of the parties 
(typically the employees) accepting some form of increased flexibility (and thus uncertainty) in 
their working life in order to receive compensation in the form of improved security arrangements 
provided by employers or the state. For the employees this obviously implies the risk of being 
cheated by accepting more flexibility, without gaining the reward in the form of increased security. 
Trust created by historical experiences with bargaining processes and maybe supported by some 
form of state guarantee is necessary.  
 
The issue of economic vulnerability enters the bargaining process around flexicurity arrangements 
as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, economic crisis can be the factor which changes politi-
cal preferences and puts the need for labour market reform high on the political agenda. On the 
other hand, an economic crisis is rarely a situation in which economic resources for improving 
workers’ security are abundant. Higher public spending on income security or policies providing 
more employment security will for instance be hampered by fear of increasing deficits on the public 
budgets. Such worries can be countered by pointing to the fact that this public spending must be 
conceived as investment that will be repaid through the longer term growth stimuli from a more 
flexible labour market.  
 
Finally, one can point to the fact that the pre-existence of a certain institutional infra-structure will 
facilitate specific flexicurity arrangements. For example, a comprehensive public system for adult 
education and training will make it easier to develop flexicurity arrangements, which involves em-
ployment security in the upgrading of skills of unemployed workers or workers at risk of unem-
ployment. Also, a well-developed system of childcare is indispensable for creating security for 
working parents and thus for a flexible supply especially of younger women on the labour market.  
 
These more general points are all of crucial importance when considering the options for policy 
learning from flexicurity in other countries. Obviously they are also relevant when considering the 
transferability of the lessons from the specific Danish version of flexicurity. One important, albeit 
rather general, message is evidently that a sizeable welfare state with high levels of both taxes and 
social benefits is not incompatible with a dynamic and well-functioning labour market.  
 
The high degree of flexibility on the Danish labour market is thus supported indirectly through a 
number of welfare state services such as a comprehensive educational system, including adult voca-
tional training and education, a well-developed childcare system, (relatively) well-functioning and 
publicly financed health care, etc. In a labour market perspective, many of these welfare schemes 
can be viewed as investments in well-functioning structures, rather than costs.  
 
Translating Danish flexicurity into a direct policy prescription to be used in times of rising unem-
ployment, the main message is that the first handle to pull should not be the one labelled ‘more job 
protection’. This will only hamper the restructuring of production and employment, which is neces-
sary in order to regain growth and low unemployment. But in order to support reallocation of work-
ers to firms and sectors with growth potential and in order to combine restructuring with economic 
and social equality, security arrangements must be in place. Income support to the unemployed is a 
minimum requirement. But apart from income security, the security arrangements must focus on 
assisting the unemployed and those at risk of unemployment in getting back to employment.  
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However, it is not the aim of this report to provide detailed prescriptions on how to implement 
flexicurity policies in specific national contexts. This is a complex task better left to national ana-
lysts and policy-makers in the respective countries. Here a better comprehension of best practices 
with respect to flexicurity policies from other countries, including Denmark, can act as an important 
source of inspiration and can lay the ground for shifts in national discourses, which over time may 
lead to a ‘subtle transformation of states’ (Jacobsson 2004). The main attraction of Denmark in this 
context is therefore its uniqueness as a country that has implemented an encompassing version of a 
specific form of flexicurity. And as any teacher will know, one real-life example tells more than a 
torrent of abstractions. 
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4. Flexicurity in Japan  
 
In the following we will apply the flexicurity framework to characterise the relationship between 
different forms of flexibility and security in Japan. First, we begin by characterising the traditional 
combination of job stability and internal flexibilities that permeated the life-time employment prac-
tice. Second, we proceed by discussing the current labour market challenges of the Japanese em-
ployment system. Empirically, we will rely on existing research reports and data material to provide 
a fresh account of the Japanese labour market and employment system in a flexicurity perspective.8 
 
4.1. Lifetime employment and job security 
 
Japan is well known for its life-time employment system. In relation to the concept of flexicurity, it 
provides high (albeit informal) job security, where job stability and low external numerical flexibil-
ity is traded off against high internal flexibility. This internal flexibility consists of in-house mobil-
ity within jobs and across tasks, on the job training and retraining, seniority wages and working-
time flexibility. Thus, the Japanese labour market system has traditionally been focused on job sta-
bility and maintenance of employment within firms. This type of internal labour market flexicurity 
is in sharp contrast to the external labour market flexicurity of the Danish system, and the institu-
tional differences are reflected in average tenure and tenure distribution, as reported below (cf. ILO 
2005).  
 
Table 1: Average tenure and tenure distribution in selected countries 
 Average tenure (years) Workers with less than 1 
year’s tenure (%) 
Workers with more than 
10 year’s tenure (%) 
Greece 13.6 9.8 52.1 
Japan 12.2 8.3 43.2 
Italy 12.2 10.8 49.3 
France 11.2 15.3 44.2 
Germany 10.6 14.3 41.7 
Denmark 8.3 20.9 31.5 
United Kingdom 8.2 19.1 32.1 
United States 6.6 24.5 26.2 
Sources: Data for Europe from 2002 based on Eurostat; US data from 1998 based on national sources. Data for Japan 
from 2000, cf.Ono 2006. 
 
The tenure data for Japan are similar to those of a number of continental and southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy and France), while Denmark more closely resembles the liberal Anglo-
Saxon countries (United Kingdom and United States). A variety of factors accounts for these differ-
ences (like the age composition of a country, differences in GDP growth, differences in company 
size structures, the stringency of employment protection legislation, union presence etc.). For our 
purposes, the most interesting explanatory variable of job tenure is the stringency of employment 
protection legislation. The formal and informal rules of recruiting and dismissing are embodied in 
the Japanese practice of life-time employment, which we describe below.   
                                                 
8
 In addition we have conducted interviews with senior researchers at the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training 
(Hirokazu Fujii and Shunichi Uemura) and with representatives of the human resources division of the IT-company 
Sorun Corporations (Koji Nakajima) and the labour relations division of Toyota (Katsuhiko Ogino). Our initial findings 
have been presented at a seminar at the JILPT and to the councilor for the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare 
(Nakano Masayuki).  
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After World War II when Japan was in economic and material ruin, the establishment of economic 
security and protection of minimum standards of living was the highest priority of the government 
(Araki 2002).9 Although Japanese firms developed flexible mass production and quality circles 
based on American organisational models, other procedures, such as job evaluation and the lay-off 
system, were not adopted due to their incompatibility with Japanese traditions and norms. Instead of 
legal enforcement, employers and enterprises developed internal enforcement mechanisms based on 
long-term labour relations and joint labour-management consultation. This means that even during 
downturns, corporations have refrained from dismissing employees (Passet 2003: 161).   
 
In Japan, lifetime employment is not a contractual state. It does not emerge from employment pro-
tection legislation or collective agreements, but is rather to be considered an informal and mutual 
expectation between employers and workers.10 As a rather unique feature of Japanese recruitment 
practices, employers hire workers immediately after graduation (so-called infancy) and retains them 
in open-ended contracts until retirement (typically at age 60). In return workers are expected not to 
seek and apply for jobs in the external labour market and to remain loyal and committed to the 
company. One typical expression of these mutual expectations (or self-imposed rigidities) in Japa-
nese firms is Dore (1996: 8): “By self-imposed rigidities, I mean the acceptance, by managers, of a 
wide range of constraints on their freedom of action – lifetime employment guarantees, tight senior-
ity constraints on promotion, acceptance of the need to engineer consent, to maintain close consul-
tation with employees or their unions – that acceptance of constraint being rewarded by a ‘com-
mitment’ on the part of employees which greatly facilities the firm’s ‘flexible’ adaptation to new 
technologies and new market opportunities”. Dore goes on to explain how committed employees, 
not fearful of dismissal, are more willing to accept a complete change of job function, to undergo 
training, less likely to leave the firm, and more willing to accept wage restraint when the company 
faces difficulties.  
   
As mentioned, judicial practice and not legislation is the foundation for Japanese job security.11 The 
courts gradually accumulated case laws that restricted the right of dismissal by requiring employers 
to provide “just cause”. 1979 case law established four conditions to be met before regular employ-
ees could be dismissed: (1) employers should be faced with compelling and unavoidable necessity 
for dismissals; (2) they should have made every effort to avoid dismissals (e.g. transfers to affiliated 
companies, terminating employment of temporary and part-time workers, facilitating early retire-
ment, reducing overtime and suspending new hires); (3) they should consult with trade union repre-
sentatives and employees about dismissals; and (4) they should establish reasonable standards and 
apply them fairly when selecting workers for dismissal (Araki 2002: 26). By implication, even dur-
                                                 
9
 In 1946 the Ministry of Labour was established, and the year after a number of protective laws was enacted, among 
them the Labour Standards Law. 
10
 By measuring employment protection legislation (protection of permanent workers against individual dismissal, 
specific requirements for collective dismissal, and regulation of temporary forms of employment), the summary indexes 
of the OECD tend to underestimate job security in Japan. Therefore, Denmark and Japan are actually placed next to 
each other in the 2003 index, among the countries with below average job protection (the index does indicate, however, 
that protection of permanent workers is less strict in Denmark than in Japan) (OECD 2004).  
11
 Japan has no courts specially designated for labour disputes; therefore, all labour and employment related lawsuits 
must be filed in ordinary courts. The number of labour cases is extremely small compared to other industrialized coun-
tries. This could be related to the fact that there are high costs in relation to judicial procedures for the individual in 
terms of money and time, and also some socio-cultural and psychological hesitancy over litigation (Araki 2002: 11-12, 
28). 
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ing economic downturns and restructuring, dismissals of regular workers has become the very last 
resort after other types of internal devices for flexibility and cost-reduction have been applied (like 
transfer, dismissal of non-regular workers, reduction of overtime, hiring freeze) (Araki 2002: chap-
ter 2).12 These requirements for economic dismissals are more strict than in other industrialised 
countries, which is further stressed by the fact that in cases of unjust dismissal, Japanese employers 
are not only obliged to pay wages during the whole period of dismissal, but also to reinstate the 
dismissed employee (Araki 2002: 27).  
 
It should be noted that while lifetime employment is perceived as a main pillar of the Japanese em-
ployment system, in practice, it applies only to a minority of the labour force. Despite difficulties in 
measuring lifetime employment, Ono (2006) estimates that roughly 20% of the labour force can be 
defined as lifetime workers (i.e. workers who were employed immediately after school graduation, 
and has never been employed by a firm other than the current one). This rate covers substantial dif-
ferences by gender, firm size, and education level. At its extreme, the proportion of lifetime workers 
among male university graduates in large firms is 55%, and the 30 years survival probability of 
male workers in government is 65% (Ono 2006: 34).13 The fact that only one in five workers can be 
classified as lifetime employees does not mean that the remaining are non-regular fixed-term work-
ers. Actually, more than 70% of the workforce is permanently employed in open-ended contracts.  
 
During and after the recession of the 1990s, however, the proportion of standard workers declined 
from 80.2% in 1991 to 69.6% in 2003. In absolute numbers, standard workers declined by 2 mil-
lion, while the number of non-standard workers expanded by 6.1 million (Ono 2006: 11). Since 
2003, the decline in standard (regular) workers has continued, and the number of non-regular work-
ers has climbed to 33.2% of the total number of employees (16.63 mil. in first quarter 2006). None-
theless, Ono (2006) shows that the proportion of lifetime workers as a percentage of the labour 
force (defined as those who were employed immediately after school graduation and have been 
continuously employed by the same employer) has actually increased across all age categories dur-
ing the period 1980 to 2000. The proportion of workers in lifetime employment is much higher 
among men than women, among middle-aged and older workers than younger workers, among 
large companies, and among white-collar executives (Ono 2006). In a study of retention rates, Kato 
                                                 
12
 Since 2000, several district courts have significantly changed the interpretation of the four requirements above to 
make it easier to dismiss regular workers. Rather than insisting that all four requirements should be met for economic 
dismissals, the courts should consider if a dismissal is abusive even if for instance unions have not been consulted. This 
new interpretation provoked heated debate, and it is still to early to judge if the new interpretation will replace the tradi-
tional interpretation (Araki 2002: 26-27). 
13
 As a result of lifetime employment practices, Japanese employers seem to have a stronger preference for “organisa-
tional growth” (maintaining the human resources of the organisation) than maximising profits in order to satisfy share-
holders. This is also related to the fact that the financial institutions (including banks and insurance companies) own a 
high share of the total stock outstanding of listed companies, and there are usually one or a few influential city banks for 
each listed company that own up to the maximum. Because a large proportion of the equities held by banks and other 
corporate entities are extremely stable, the managements of Japanese firms are insulated from takeover raids through the 
open market. Individual stockholders only have minority shares, and do not have any effective voice in the corporate 
governance structure (Aoki 1990: 14ff.). 
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(2001: 494) finds “little evidence for serious erosion of the practice of life-time employment”.14 This 
is also confirmed by data on separation rates (measuring the total number of separations divided by 
the total number of employed persons) showing that the outflow of workers changed very little from 
1991 to 2003, although it increased modestly for part-time workers, for large firms (1.000+ em-
ployees) and regular male workers (Ono 2006: 29). As Kato (2001) explains the burden of downsiz-
ing during the economic slowdown in the 1990s have fallen disproportionately on younger and 
middle-aged employees with short tenure, particularly women. Rather than dismissing workers, 
large firms in Japan have been trying to restructure and downsize by relying on transfers of their 
employees to their subsidiaries and related firms and by cutting on new recruits (Kato 2001: 489). 
 
In summary –and despite the prolonged recession of the 1990s - there seems to be job stability in 
the core of the labour market (among middle-aged and older male workers), while there is increas-
ing fluctuation at the margins (or peripheries) of the labour market (especially among young per-
sons and women in non-regular employment). This implies a stronger bifurcation of the labour 
market with increasing social and economic disparities (the current challenges of the Japanese em-
ployment system are described in greater detail in section 4.2. below). It also implies that the prac-
tice of lifetime employment is still the dominant norm in recruitment and personnel management of 
employees in Japan, and is not necessarily substantially eroding despite current challenges.   
 
4.1.1. Internal flexibility 
 
Under the lifetime employment practice, employees are trained in-house and promotions and wage 
increases are based on seniority. The actual operation of this personnel system is rather flexible, as 
this quote illustrates: “…when business is slow, rather than resorting to drastic employment ad-
justment measures such as sudden dismissals, a variety of measures such as limitations of overtime 
hours, reassignment of employees, restraint in or discontinuation of hiring new employees, and 
loaning or transferring employees to affiliated companies has been implemented” (JLIPT 2006: 33). 
Rather than relying on hire-and-fire policies on the external labour market, Japanese corporations 
have responded to variations in the business cycle by applying a range of internal flexibility buffers, 
which we briefly describe below. 
 
Variations in working hours create internal flexibility for Japanese enterprises. In general, actual 
working hours are fluctuating with the business cycle; during a recession working time for core 
workers is reduced to avoid dismissals (especially overtime hours). Alternatively, during economic 
booms working time is increased (workers are paying back their debts for not being dismissed dur-
ing recession). Changes in the composition of working hours have played a significant part in ad-
justing working hours. Until the enactment of the revised Labour Standards Law in 1988, the 
change in total working time was strongly dependent on changes in overtime hours. Although 
changes in overtime work still play an important cyclical role, there has also been a sharp decrease 
                                                 
14
 Beyond Japan, the thesis on the end of stable and permanent jobs does not find convincing empirical support either. 
Auer (2006) conclude on the basis of the existing literature that OECD-countries have a varying, but substantial share of 
long-term employment relationships and are characterized by a degree of stability in their employment systems that is 
remarkable in respect to the dominant view of a much more volatile labour market (see also Auer & Cazes 2003). Auer, 
furthermore, presents recent data for EU-15 showing that average employment tenure has hardly changed between 1992 
and 2005 (10.48 years and 10.74 years respectively). The World Employment Report 2004-05 (ILO 2005) also docu-
ment that the differences in tenure between countries are resilient over time. 
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in regular working time (Passet 2003: 165).15 Many companies are gradually shifting towards a 
five-day, 40 hours working week, and increasingly use part-time and short-time workers (cf. section 
4.2). Despite the legal shift towards a five-day and 40 hours working week in 1987, actual working 
hours has remained extremely long in Japan.16 The most important reasons being that overtime is 
incorporated into the employment system as a means to absorb business fluctuations without resort-
ing to economic dismissals, and because there is a low take-up of annual paid leaves and holidays 
(Araki 2002; Japan Labour Review 2006: 3(3)).17 Thus, variations in working time functions as an 
important internal flexibility buffer for Japanese companies.    
 
Seniority wages are also closely linked to the lifetime employment system. In Japan, wages are 
determined by length of service, age and educational background. It can be understood as a method 
deferring payment of wages that provides employees with an incentive to remain employed with the 
same company for a long time. In principle, wages are set below marginal productivity for those 
who have been employed for a relatively short time, while wages are offered above marginal pro-
ductivity for those who have been employed for a longer time (Kazuo 2004; Araki 2002). This sen-
iority-based wage system means that wages are not determined by the work performed or job con-
tent; by implication the amount of wages remains the same even if a worker is internally transferred 
to a different job or the job content is altered (Araki 2002: 70). The Japanese seniority wage system 
is, furthermore, unique in the fact that it covers not only white-collar workers, but also blue-collar 
workers, which has traditionally contributed to reduce wage and income disparities (for recent 
changes of the wage system, see section 4.2. below).   
 
The final internal flexibility device underpinning the lifetime employment system is functional 
flexibility; understood as the employers scope for transferring workers between job functions and 
tasks (both horizontally and vertically), internal job changes, flexible work organisation, multiple 
skills of the employees, and on-the-job learning (Bredgaard et al 2006; Lesche et al 2006; Wiltha-
gen & Tros 2004). Functional flexibility in Japan is based on in-house training of employees over 
the long term. It consists primarily of informal on-the-job training and internal job rotation. It is 
compatible with lifetime employment, since corporations making firm-specific human capital in-
vestments are interested in retaining core workers on a long-term basis to recoup their investments. 
In general, the system works as follow: Newly recruited graduates are typically trained by experi-
encing different types of work in several departments within a company or corporate group (multi-
ple skills). Through such broad job rotation, companies can evaluate employee’s performance and 
determine the type of work for which they are best suited. These assignments and transfers are car-
ried out together with the management of seniority-based promotions as well as internal competi-
                                                 
15
 Annual working hours have declined by some 400 hours since the 1960s. Still international comparisons show that 
Japan has about the same annual working hours as the United States (around 1.950 hours in 2002), which is considera-
bly higher than most European countries (JILPT 2006; OECD 2006). In Japan there is in comparison to European coun-
tries a higher proportion of non-scheduled working hours and lower proportion of annual paid leaves taken (JILPT 
2006: 47). 
16
 As an indication of the long working hours in Japan, the proportion of workers working more than 50 hours a week in 
year 2002 was 28% compared to 20% in the United States, 15% in the United Kingdom, 5% in Denmark, and 1.4% in 
the Netherlands (Messenger 2004 quoted in Ogura 2006). 
17
 Workers are by implication subject to unlimited overtime once labour and management have reached an agreement 
allowing overtime. Even if there is a upper limit of 360 hours per year, there are no sanctions for violating this limit. 
Finally, the overtime premium is extremely low compared by international standards, and there is a high level of unpaid 
overtime. 
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tion. In general, an employment contract usually will not specify concrete conditions of employ-
ment, which makes functional adaptations possible (Araki 2002: 57).    
 
4.1.2. Income and employment security 
 
This system of high internal flexibility and job security is mirrored in a system of low external secu-
rity. Since private companies and public institutions have traditionally delivered job security 
through lifetime employment, there has been no pressing need for a pervasive system of social secu-
rity or employment security. Therefore, labour market policies have, until recently, been few, and 
put in place mainly to maintain job stability. Labour market policies have focussed on subsidising 
job maintenance (employment insurance) rather than job creation or unemployment reduction (Pas-
set 2003: 160).18 Passet (2003: 160) describes that: “For example unemployment insurance is ”em-
ployment insurance” in Japan, supporting employment maintenance rather than compensating lay-
offs. The outcome is good protection of insiders, with public labour market policies supporting 
policies concerning short-term work, training and transfers between jobs”. This is indicated by the 
fact that Japan has one of the lowest expenditures on labour market policies (as a percentage of 
GDP) among OECD-countries, while Denmark has the highest (see figure below). 
 
Figure 4: Expenditures on labour market policies in OECD-countries (passive and active, percent-
age of GDP), 2004  
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Source: OECD (2006): Employment Outlook. 
 
                                                 
18
 Since 1975, the employment adjustment subsidy has played a central role in Japan’s employment policy. When enter-
prises in designated industries strive to maintain employment during a downturn, this subsidy can be granted in the form 
of partial payment of wages, and to cover temporary leave allowances or to subsidize training of employees (Passet 
2003: 200). 
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In 2004, total expenditure for labour market policies was 4.5% of GDP in Denmark (1.83% of GDP 
for active labour market policy), while the comparable figures in Japan was 0,74% (0.28% of GDP 
for active labour market policies). In Denmark, the central government finances around 2/3 of ex-
penditures for unemployment benefits and active labour market policies out of general taxation, 
while contributory premiums of insured members of unemployment insurance funds (ar-
bejdsløshedskasser) finance the remaining. Thereby, employers and corporations do not guarantee 
employment and pay for redundancies, and the hiring and firing costs of Danish businesses are very 
low. Further, the costs of training and education of ordinary employees is also to a high extent 
borne by the central government treasury, and indirectly serves as a government subsidy to the 
competitiveness of Danish industry. In contrast, 70-80% of government revenues for unemployment 
benefits and active labour market policies in Japan come from contributory benefits (the govern-
ment pays the remaining from the national treasury). Premiums for unemployment benefits are col-
lected 50% from employers and 50% from employees, while premiums for labour market policies 
are collected only from employers.19 This heavy dependence on premiums makes Japanese labour 
market policy sensitive to the fluctuations of the business cycle. During recession when unemploy-
ment increases, the premiums of employers increase as well, which makes it difficult to break a 
vicious circle, and gives corporations strong incentives to avoid dismissals.   
 
When these differences in expenditures are combined with replacements rates and maximum dura-
tion of unemployment insurance it becomes abundantly clear that the Danish system of unemploy-
ment protection provides a much higher degree of income security than the Japanese system. OECD 
(2006) has calculated historical time series and summary measures on the gross replacement rate in 
percentage of former wage. The summary measure is defined as the average of the gross unem-
ployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three dura-
tions of unemployment. The figure below gives an indication of the differences between Denmark 
and Japan in this respect.  
 
                                                 
19
 On top of this, premiums shared equally by employers and employees also finance the majority (87.5%) of the so-
called employment continuation benefits covering benefits for re-employment of older workers as well as child care and 
family care leave benefits. 
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Figure 5: OECD summary measure of benefit entitlements 
Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models (2006). Own calculation of OECD average.  
 
It shows that in Japan throughout the period from the 1960s to 2003 the gross replacement rate has 
been almost constant around 10%. In comparison gross replacement rates in Denmark has increased 
from around 20% in the early 1960s to 65% in 1995, and then declining to 50% in 2003.  
 
Further, the duration of unemployment insurance is 90-360 days in Japan and there is no last resort 
safety net after exhaustion.20 In Denmark, the duration of unemployment benefits is 4 years, after 
which social assistance is available (means-tested, indefinite duration, but conditional upon partici-
pation in active measures). Finally, it should be noted that the Japanese unemployment insurance 
system has extremely strict conditions for eligibility, which is indicated by the fact that the ratio of 
benefit receipt to total unemployed was only around 1/3 at the end of the 1990s (Passet 2003: 
205).21   
 
In that respect, the relative lack of a labour market policy in Japan for reintegrating unemployed on 
the open labour market, and providing income support during unemployment spells, is consistent 
with the practice of lifetime employment. The differences between the unemployment security sys-
                                                 
20
 The duration of unemployment benefit entitlements increases with age and years of contribution, and also depends on 
the reason for unemployment (voluntary job leavers have shorter benefit duration than involuntary dismissed or dis-
abled persons). For instance, middle-aged (45-64 years) disabled persons with more than one year’s contribution are 
entitled to the maximum 360 days, while voluntary job leavers with less than 10 years contribution and young people 
(less than 35 years) with less than 10 years contribution are only entitled to 90 days unemployment insurance.   
21
 It is also worth noting that Japanese enterprises finances the retirement pension system of their workers paid in pro-
portion to the number of years of service at a specific company and depending on the reason for retirement (voluntary 
versus mandatory or company requested retirement). Again, this retirement system promotes the longtime employment 
system. 
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tems indicate that in Japan social security is mainly provided through employment maintenance.22 
Rather than externalising the costs of dismissals, unemployment, sickness and retirement to the 
society (in Denmark; the public budget), Japanese corporations have to a high extent internalised 
these costs. In contrast to Denmark, public policies in Japan, whether on employment protection 
legislation, labour market policies or social and welfare policies have a relatively small impact on 
the labour market.  
 
The Japanese employment system characterised by the practice of lifetime employment, job stabil-
ity and internal flexibilities in large internal labour market proved to be efficient in the period after 
the Second World War. Unemployment rates remained low throughout the period until the reces-
sion of the 1990s, and the employment system provided high job security and stability for regular 
workers. The lifetime employment system was also conducive to an industrial relations system fa-
vourable to successful employee participation which contributed to the post-war success of Japa-
nese firms, and has inspired many corporations in the world to experiment with employee involve-
ment and labour-management cooperation (Kato 2001: 491). However, with the collapse of the 
bubble economy in the early 1990s, Japans long-term employment practice and employment poli-
cies have faced significant challenges, as we describe in the next section.  
 
 
4.2. Current challenges for the balance between job security and internal flexibility  
 
From 1955 and onwards Japan experienced high annual economic growth, making Japan an eco-
nomic superpower. The Japanese life-time employment practice worked as an efficient employment 
system in this period. However, the recession starting in the early 1990s with low economic growth, 
intensified global competition and changing attitudes and preferences among workers has put the 
lifetime employment model and the traditional flexicurity-balance between internal flexibility and 
(internal) job security under pressure. The major problem seems to be, that it is very difficult to 
maintain and guarantee internal job security without the steady economic growth that traditionally 
has characterised the Japanese society. Although the companies have made persistent efforts to keep 
up to the expectations of life-time employment during the recession, this has turned out to be quite 
difficult. The traditional Japanese “flexicurity-balance” seems in this respect to have become unbal-
anced.  
 
In the next section we first have a closer look at the pressure on the internal flexibility system that 
previously served as a “buffer”, when labour costs had to be reduced under economic downturns. 
Second, we proceed by analysing the challenges of an apparently higher external numerical flexibil-
ity on the Japanese labour market, in some part created by the insufficiency of the internal flexibil-
ity system to cope with longer periods of recession. This includes, among other things, the chal-
lenges of unemployment and the increase in non-regular workers and the accompanying problems 
with economic inequalities and poverty, created by lack of external security-arrangements (em-
ployment and income security) for people outside regular employment. 
 
                                                 
22
 Since the mid-1980s, the government has, however, repeatedly implemented plans to reduce job disparities between 
prime-age male workers on the one hand, and the female labour force, the young, middle-aged and older workers on the 
other hand. The largest programs pays either wage subsidies to increase job opportunities for disabled and older work-
ers, who are referred by the public employment service, or pays subsidies to enterprises continuing to employ workers 
beyond retirement age. There are also smaller employment programs for depressed regions and employment in SMEs 
(Passet 2003: 198-99).  
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4.2.1. The pressure on the internal flexibility system 
 
The life-time employment system first of all tries to meet the demands for flexibility trough high 
internal flexibility, which is traded off against high job security for the regular workforce. The in-
ternal flexibility consists of wage flexibility, working time flexibility and functional flexibility. The 
companies make huge efforts to life up to the expectations of delivering life-time jobs, and to avoid 
dismissals of regular workers. During economic recessions this creates pressure on the adaptability 
of the internal flexibility system, and results in wage cuts, reduction of (paid) working hours, less 
internal upward job mobility (promotion) to mention the most important flexibility buffers to put in 
use. During the recession the use of these “buffers” have been very profound. The utilization and 
impacts of these three types of flexibility forms will be investigated more in detail in the following. 
 
Wage-flexibility 
 
Rather than reforming the life-time employment system, Japanese companies stick to use other 
forms of internal flexibility. In contrast to their counterparts in the US, Germany and the UK, indus-
tries in Japan are more prone to keep labour excess during an economic downturn. They instead use 
wage-rate flexibility linked to variation in working hours and bonuses as well as transfers to lower-
wage positions as the most important buffers to economic fluctuations on the labour market (Passet 
2003: 165). This has during the recession resulted in a general very low wage-development, as seen 
in the figure below.  
 
Figure 6: Rate of Change in Monthly Cash Payment  
 
 
 
 
Source: Japan Institute for Labour Market Policy and Training: “Japanese Working Life Profile 2006/2007, 
Labour Statistics”. 
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The low general wage-development (especially concerning the latest years development) also re-
flects the rise in the composition ratio of part-time employees on low wage levels, which is used by 
the companies to lower labour costs. In 2005, high wage increases for ordinary workers meant that 
the lowering effect caused by the increase in the composition ratio of part-time employees was re-
duced, and as a result, for the first time in five years, there was an increase in the total cash earn-
ings, up by 0.6% year-on-year (JILPT 2006). One consequence of this is a widening of the wage 
disparities between regular employees and non regular employees (JILPT 2006). 
 
One important change concerning wages is that companies are increasingly introducing perform-
ance-based wage systems, in addition to attaching less importance to seniority (JILPT 2006). With 
the rapid ageing of the workforce and the planned postponement of mandatory retirement age from 
60 to 65 years, the seniority wage system will result in substantial increases in personnel cost (Ka-
zuo 2004). As stated by Araki: “Employers can no longer maintain both long-term employment as 
well as the seniority-based wage system. According to various opinion surveys, a de facto consen-
sus exists between management and labour concerning the preservation of long-term employment.  
Therefore it is more likely that the seniority-wage system, rather than the long-term unemployment 
system, will be modified” (Araki 2002: 73). And this is what seems to be happening. Performance 
based wage systems extensively replace seniority-based wages. One important consequence of this 
is, that the implicit contract between employer and employees of setting wages below marginal 
productivity for newly employed in return for wage above marginal productivity for long-time em-
ployed is broken. The impact of this could be higher job-insecurity for the younger employees, hav-
ing no assurance of longer terms benefits of accepting a low starting salary, as well as senior work-
ers losing earned privileges serving the same employer for life (Passet 2003). Internal security is 
lost on behalf of internal flexibility to lower labour cost during an economic downturn,  
 
Working-hour flexibility 
 
According to the philosophy behind the life-time employment system, a tendency of decreased 
weekly working hour can be observed trough out the recession period. And an increase in non-
scheduled working-hours the last couple of years can be observed reflecting the economic recovery 
(JILPT 2006). 
 
The major explanation for the overall reduction in scheduled working hours during the economic 
downturn is largely due to the increase in persons with shorter working hours (the percentage of 
people working less than 35 hours increased from 18% in 1992 to 24% in 2004). At the same time, 
non-scheduled working hours (both paid and unpaid) constantly exist in a large number of Japanese 
companies, and in some extreme cases result in “death from overwork” (karoshi).23 The percentage 
of those working more than 60 hours is also marginally increasing (from 11% in 1993 to 12% in 
2004), thus indicating an increasing polarisation of working hours (JILPT 2006: 98).   
 
The variation in working-hours and wages gives an uneven distribution on groups and status of 
work, and is one of the major challenges for the Japanese labour market. Especially if job-insecurity 
and economic disparities should be avoided in order to increase the general participation of people 
on the labour market. 
 
                                                 
23
 Although the Labour Standards Act prescribes an annual maximum of 360 overtime hours per workers, there is no 
penalty for violating the standards (JILPT 2006: 47). 
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Functional flexibility 
 
Functional flexibility consists of job quality, mobility within jobs and across, reduction of job 
boundaries and flexibility in job design, training and retraining. In Japan, functional flexibility can 
also be used to meet demands of flexibility and the need for lowering labour cost. The traditional 
implicit agreement in the life-time employment system are, that the employee gradually moves up 
in the job-hierarchy, at the same time as skills and competencies are developed primarily through on 
the job training within the firm. Increasing functional flexibility in accordance with the companies’ 
efforts to reduce labour cost, especially make young and older workers vulnerable.  
 
The reason why young and older employees are vulnerable to functional flexibility in the life-time 
employment system is that companies in Japan try to adapt to an economic downturn by hire freeze 
and relative low mandatory retirement age for older workers (see below in section on external nu-
merical flexibility). When cut backs primarily are made by curtailing new hiring, the consequence 
for the young employee is, that no one younger them themselves enters the company. In 2003, the 
number of new graduates hired had fallen by 53% from its 1997-level, contributing to the rise in the 
unemployment rate in the 15-24 age group to 10% (OECD 2005: 175) 
 
This makes it hard to changes job functions or move up in the job hierarchy (by acquiring more 
advanced knowledge and skills). There are also fewer opportunities for on-the job training because 
of the lack of time and money. In that case, the normal attractive career prospective for young 
workers in life-time employment becomes less attractive. The statistics seems to confirm this situa-
tion (see below). 
 
Figure 7: Cohort Comparison of Management Position by Age Bracket (university graduates) 
 
 
Source: White Paper on the Labour Economy 2005, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
 
The figure shows the proportion of university graduates in management positions, the younger gen-
erations they are, the lower the rate are occupying management positions, even among the same age 
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class. Just to give one example, around three times as many born 1950-1954 were holding a man-
agement position when they were in their early 30s, compared to the ones born 1970-1974.  
 
In general for promotion, the average age by job grade is rising for all grades, reflecting a changing 
company age structure, with an increasing number of middle-age and older persons (Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare 2005).  
 
Especially this problem concerning the recruitment of young people to life-time employment under 
an economic recession put the life-time employment system under pressure. Fewer young people 
are recruited for regular work in general, but the low changes in functional flexibility even make it 
less attractive to the ones hired. The intensive Japanese discussions on young workers changing 
attitude to work seems related to this pressure on the internal flexibility system. Although it is 
probably only part of the explanation (Yuji 2001). 
 
Also the older workers are more vulnerable in terms of job positions, when the life-time employ-
ment system is under pressure. On the one hand, the companies prefer a low mandatory retirement 
age if they are going to secure life-time employment (among other things in order to reduce exceed-
ing labour costs due to the seniority-wage system) (Yuji 2001). On the other hand, the public au-
thorities stress the importance of a higher retirement age in response to the greying of the Japanese 
population. Hence, the Older Persons Employment Security Law (revised in 1994) now prohibits 
the setting of a mandatory age under 60, and the law includes a provision concerning the em-
ployer’s duty to endeavour to raise the mandatory retirement age or to continue to employ those 
reaching mandatory retirement age but still desiring to work for the same employer until the age of 
65 (Araki 2002). However, many older workers in practice separate from their employers before 
reaching mandatory retirement age in the functional flexibility forms of Shukko or Tenseki.24As 
stated by Araki in this respect: “The recent increase in Shukko and Tenseki certainly indicates a 
transformation of the long-term employment system” (Araki 2002: 29). Together with the other 
changes in functional flexibility it tends to generate insecurity for the older workers in general (Pas-
set 2003).  
 
To sum up, the internal flexibility works as effective and adaptable buffers under recession, but the 
prolonged period put the internal flexibility under a severe pressure. This pressure is so high, that 
the very core of the life-time system seems to be endangered, namely the trust of the Japanese 
flexicurity balance between life-time job security and acceptance of high internal flexibility. In fact, 
the Japanese labour market is hit by the paradox that the feeling of job-insecurity is among one of 
the highest in the world, despite the high job security inherent in the life-time employment system 
(Passet 2003, Boyer 2006). This has probably to do with the changing work conditions due to the 
extensive use of internal flexibility, but of course also a result of the Japanese dual labour market 
structure and the increasing use of external numerical flexibility. As shown in the next section, ex-
ternal numerical flexibility comes in use as the last resort, when the internal flexibility reaches its 
limits in order to maintain the life-time employment system.  
 
                                                 
24
 Shukko refers to transfers to another company while maintaining the workers status with the original company. Ten-
seki refers to transfers to another company dissolving the employment relation with the original company (Araki 
2002:132). 
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4.2.2. External numerical flexibility 
 
External numerical flexibility involves the process of changes in the number of employees, and 
thereby also reflects the transition between firms and from employment to unemployment and back. 
Companies and supporting public policies have been targeted at maintaining life-time employment 
and the advantages attached to this, and numerical flexibility has been seen as the last resort. The 
main axis of the system has been the flexicurity balance between job security and internal flexibil-
ity. Nevertheless, despite an intensive use of internal flexibility buffers (and a corresponding de-
crease in internal security), external numerical flexibility has increased on the Japanese labour mar-
ket. Two major indicators of this are unemployment and the increase in non-regular workers. The 
developments and impacts of these phenomenons are analyzed in the following.  
 
The unemployment problem 
 
The labour market performance of both Denmark and Japan are well above the average in the 
OECD-area, when it comes to unemployment. The current outlook in the two countries is, neverthe-
less, interpreted quite differently. Despite almost similar unemployment rates (in 2005, 4.8% in 
Denmark and 4.4% in Japan) Denmark is currently considered to be heading for labour shortages 
and “full employment”, while Japan has departed from a prolonged period of “full employment”. In 
the 1990s Japan experienced unprecedented increasing unemployment rates. From 1990 and until 
the early 2000’s the unemployment rate more than doubled in Japan, while it was more than halved 
in Denmark (figure below).  
 
Figure 8: Unemployment as a percentage of the labour force, 1987-2005 
 
Source: OECD: Employment Outlook 2006. 
 
The Japanese interpretation of unemployment being a severe problem could be a result of the dif-
ferent starting point compared to Denmark, making unemployment a new phenomenon in Japan. 
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But some other characteristics related to the Japanese employment system and life-time employ-
ment entail, that unemployment creates more serious problems. First, external social security is very 
weak, and not geared to deal with the problems of reintegrating unemployed people into employ-
ment or compensate the unemployed for loss of income. Hence, the Japanese benefit system has a 
low net-replacement rate and a short duration period compared to the Danish system. As shown in 
section 4.1.2 (figure 5) the OECD summary measure of benefit entitlements gives an indication of 
the major differences between Denmark and Japan in this respect.  
 
Another serious problem is the composition of the group of unemployed. Japan struggle with rela-
tive high youth unemployment caused by lack of labour market entrances. With an 8% unemploy-
ment rate for the 15-24 year old and a growing number of Freeters25 (from 500.000 persons in 
1982, 1.500.000 in 1997 and 2.010.000 in 2006) and NEET26 (from 400.000 in 1985 to 640.000 in 
2005), this is a profound problem (cf. JILPT 2006), especially in the light of the challenges related 
to an ageing society.27 Besides the problem that many young people are being unable to obtain 
regular employment or life-time employment, the unemployment problem also consist of, what 
could be labelled joblessness. This means that the number of people in non-regular jobs is rapidly 
increasing, at the same time as less people are moving from non-regular and part-time employment 
into regular employment.  
 
This is clearly evidenced by the situation of women on the Japanese labour market. 60% of Japa-
nese women withdraw from the labour market when their first child is born. The result is an M-
shaped labour force participation curve (peaking at the 25 to 29 age group and in the 45 to 49 age 
group).28 In fact, the lifetime employment system is not conducive to women’s labour force partici-
pation. As mentioned, lifetime employment is traded-off for internal flexibility; including in-house 
training, flexible adjustment of working conditions, and long (unpaid) working hours. Such work-
place practices makes it difficult for women to return to their original employer and resume their 
careers after childbirth, and makes part-time work more attractive to reconcile work and family 
obligations. Further, the tax and social security system as well as spouse allowances of firms dis-
courage dependent spouses from increasing their working time. Finally, childcare facilities are lim-
ited (cf. OECD 2005: 181-186). All of these factors lead to lower participation rates of women, and 
a higher proportion of women in non-regular employment. 
 
The unemployment, joblessness and the increasing dualism of employment has also been one im-
portant factor for the bigger disparities in economic opportunities that has emerged in Japan. By 
nearly any measure, Japan has increased the income inequality and is now above the OECD average 
(Mira d’Ercole 2006).  
                                                 
25
 Freeters are people between the age of 15 and 34 who lack full time employment or are unemployed, excluding 
housewives and students. They may also be described as underemployed or freelance workers. These people do not start 
a career after high school or university but instead usually live as parasite singles with their parents and earn some 
money with low skilled and low paid jobs. The low income makes it difficult for freeters to start a family, and the lack 
of qualifications make it difficult to start a career at a later point in life. 
26
 NEET is a contraction of Not in Employment, Education or Training. It includes the non-labor force population aged 
between 15 and 34, and those who neither do housework, nor attend school. 
27
 Japan deal with the problems of an ageing society and declining fertility rates. For the first time in its history, the 
population is declining). This creates a strong pressure to increase participation rates (61% in 2004) and employment 
rates in order to avoid labour shortages. Two of the major untapped labour reserves are younger workers and women. 
28
 Women have shorter tenure than most men, which is resulting in a gender wage gap (full-time regular female em-
ployee earns 35% less than her male counterpart on average) and in slower promotion for women. Women also account 
for 70% of non-regular workers, who earn considerably less than regular workers. 
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To sum up there are good reasons to interpret the employment situation as more difficult in Japan, 
although the level of unemployment is very similar between Denmark and Japan. The major prob-
lem in Japan is the lack of job openings into regular (life-time) employment for unemployed (espe-
cially the young) and people in non-regular employment. In that respect the unemployment problem 
is only the tip of the iceberg. 
 
Increase in non-regular workers 
 
Under the surface of the relative small unemployment problem in Japan (in an international com-
parison) there is a much more severe employment problem, namely the major increase in the num-
ber of non-regular (part-time, fixed term and dispatched workers), due to the lack of labour market 
entrances to regular work. This also contributes to the increasing disparities in economic opportuni-
ties in Japan. The figure below shows the changes in type of work in Japan. 
 
Figure 9: Breakdown of Employees by Status at Work 29 
   
Source:  The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training: Labour Situation in Japan and Analysis: Gen-
eral Overview 2006/2007. 
 
The decline in regular (open-ended) employment, and the rise of non-regular work (part-time, tem-
porary contracts, dispatched workers), reflects the employers needs for flexibility regarding adjust-
                                                 
29
 Sources: Special Survey of Labour Force Survey (February survey) (1986-2001) and Labour Force Survey (Detailed 
Tabulation) (2002-2005), Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Notes: 1) Rate includes 
employees other than directors. 2) A reason for the drop in the rate of part-time workers in 2002 is that the survey ques-
tionnaire for the "Labour Force Survey (Detailed Tabulation)" was different from that of the prior "Special Survey of 
Labour Force Survey," and therefore, that some people who responded until 2001 that they were part-time workers may 
have answered in 2002 that they were, contract employees or entrusted employees. 
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ments to the recession. In fact, the regulations for hiring and firing temporary employees are rela-
tively liberal.30 In Japan, there are no legal restrictions on concluding or renewing a fixed-term con-
tract (except that the term may not exceed one year) (Araki 2002: 33). The non-renewal of fixed-
term contracts, therefore, provides an important source of external numerical flexibility for Japanese 
companies. Part-time workers (less than 35 hours a week) also provide important external flexibility 
– as well as cost-reductions - for employers. On an hourly basis, part-time workers are paid only 
40% as much as full-time workers (OECD 2005: 180).31 Finally, the regulations of dispatch work-
ers (defined as a person who work for a client company but is hired out from a contracting company 
acting as his/her employer) has been liberalized since the mid-1980s, especially after the 1999 revi-
sions (Araki 2002: 40ff.).  
 
Previously, with steady economic growth the life-time employment model secured stabile employ-
ment relations with loyal employees, who were given education and training within the firm. Good 
promotion prospects, seniority pay systems and other internal security arrangements created the 
incentives for these internal career tracks. Recruitment of newly graduated young people more or 
less corresponded to the retirement of older worker, and the need to adjust for structural changes 
and the business-cycles was done by internal flexibility arrangements (functional flexibility, work-
ing-hour-flexibility and wage-flexibility, as described above). However, the recession during the 
1990s, and the intensified global competition, has created flexibility demands, that the life-time 
employment model not has been able to meet trough internal flexibility buffers. Even so, many 
Japanese companies have tried to maintain the life-time employment model as long as possible 
avoiding dismissals by enhancing early retirement and make a stop for new hires into life-time em-
ployment.32 In that respect, the lack of job-openings and the problems of increasing youth unem-
ployment in the 1990s was the result of the strong job protection for middle-aged and older workers 
(Yuji 2001). Therefore, many young people had and have no other choice than to find non-regular 
work, although they would prefer regular standard work. In contrast to this, it is a common assump-
tion that the increase in Freeters is a result of volunteer decisions and of new attitudes to work. 
Among other thing related to the concept of “parasite singles”, which means young singles living at 
home economically supported by their parents, and with low incentives to work. More volunteer job 
leaves could support this explanation, however, when cut backs primarily are made by curtailing 
new hiring, the consequence for the young employee is that upward (internal) mobility becomes 
limited, since few persons one younger than themselves enters the company. This situation makes a 
job shift more attractive.    
 
To sum up, the recession period has put the life-time employment system under such a pressure, 
that the need for flexibility could not be meet alone by internal flexibility. The consequences have 
been, that a larger proportion of the labour force now consist of non-regular workers (part-time, 
temporary contracts, dispatched workers) creating bigger economic inequalities. Still trying to 
maintain the life-time employment model in the companies however (by hire-stop and early retire-
ment), means that especially the young employees form a smaller share of people in regular em-
                                                 
30
 This is also indicated by the relatively low summary score on the OECD index on regulation for temporary workers 
(OECD 2004: 115). 
31
 Firms furthermore benefit from an additional 13% saving in non-wage costs since part-time employees are excempted 
from health insurance, pension contributions and unemployment insurance below certain thresholds, thus eliminating 
the need for co-payments from employers. 
32
 Actually close to the top of the economic crises in 2003, 36% of the companies replied in a survey, that they would 
basically maintain the life-time employment practice, 40% thought that partial adjustment was inevitable while only 
15% thought that fundamental review was necessary (JILPT 2003).  
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ployment,33 as well as work- conditions in some cases has become less attractive. Generally this has 
been a major factor behind the high feeling of job insecurity in Japan (Passet 2003).  
 
As seen in this section there are numerous current challenges for the traditional flexicurity arrange-
ment in Japan between internal flexibility and job security. As expected according to the logic in-
herent in the life-time employment model, the recession has changed the (flexicurity) balance to-
wards more internal flexibility at the expense of job security (and the other security elements in this 
like seniority-wage, upward functional mobility, etc.). This in general creates job insecurity, but 
more serious is the extensive use of external numerical flexibility, which has been necessary despite 
all the efforts done to avoid this. It looks as if Japan is changing the balance of flexibility and secu-
rity, although the overall problem seems to be, that there is no matching elements of security against 
the external flexibility. This creates increasing economic disparities and poverty as a consequence 
of unemployment and the increasing number of people in non-regular work. Especially young, 
women and older people are vulnerable to this situation. Facing the challenges of an ageing society, 
and the future need to increase the participation on the labour market in general, this development is 
in need to be turned around. The question is how. One possible way could be to consider new forms 
of flexicurity arrangements, which is the point of departure in our conclusions and policy implica-
tions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 This is confirmed by the fact that the ratio of regular employees relative to the total workforce population decreased 
for all age-groups under 30 years, and increased for all age-groups over 30 years between 1991 and 1998 (Yuji 2001: 
33).  
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5. Conclusion and policy recommendations  
 
In the post-war period, the Japanese employment system combining job security (lifetime employ-
ment) and internal flexibilities in large internal labour market has created a competitive and suc-
cessful labour market model. Since the 1960s where this combination of flexibility and security 
became firmly rooted, the practice of avoiding dismissals has maintained high employment levels 
(especially for male breadwinners), job stability and low unemployment rates. Through the lifetime 
employment commitments of Japanese corporations an elaborate system of internal labour market 
flexibilities was developed. Core (regular) workers were recruited immediately after graduation and 
maintained in the same company or affiliated companies until retirement. This system gave strong 
incentives for building up in-house training and education systems, and created a committed and 
loyal workforce. Years of seniority were the basis for a predictable system of remuneration and 
promotion to senior positions within the company. Auxiliary public policies were constructed to 
supplement and maintain job stability and lifetime employment. By implication labour market poli-
cies primarily focused on subsidizing the maintenance of existing jobs (employment insurance).  
 
As the Japanese economy felt into a prolonged recession in the 1990s it also called into question 
key elements of this Japanese flexicurity system; the practice of lifetime employment, seniority pay 
system, and internal promotion system. The steady economic growth and a constant influx of new 
graduates which were important preconditions of the lifetime employment system became increas-
ingly difficult to maintain. In order to avoid dismissals but maintain competitiveness and reduce 
costs, Japanese companies stretched internal flexibility buffers to its limits. To avoid the automatic 
increases in salaries (also in the light of a rapidly greying workforce) the seniority-wage system is 
gradually being replaced by a performance-related pay system honouring merits and capabilities, 
while wage increases have remained low or even negative. Overtime work has been reduced to save 
labour costs. Downsizing and restructuring is also achieved by transfers of redundant workers to 
subsidiaries and affiliated companies. Further, companies have responded to the recession by freez-
ing or reducing new hiring (especially of young graduates), which also reduce opportunities for 
upward mobility of those young people who are hired. The result of this is an increasingly unbal-
anced relationship between internal flexibility and internal security. 
 
Despite the extensive use of these internal flexibility buffers, job stability became difficult to main-
tain and the use of external numerical flexibility increased. Since the 1990s, there has been a steady 
increase in recruitment of non-regular workers (part-time workers, temporary agency workers and 
dispatch workers). Non-regular workers increasingly perform the external numerical flexibility, 
which cannot be provided by regular workers, and, thus, function as shock absorbers to protect 
regular workers from fluctuating economic circumstances. Non-regular work is remunerated on a 
much lower level than regular work, which is one of the main explanations for increasing wage and 
income disparities in Japan. Furthermore, the job security (wages, bonuses, working conditions, 
transitions to regular employment) and income security (entitlements to unemployment insurance, 
health insurance, and retirement allowances) of non-regular workers is inferior to that of regular 
workers.  
 
As a result of reluctance to hire new regular workers, unemployment rates started to climb in the 
1990s, especially for young people. Even those young people who manage to enter the labour mar-
ket are increasingly hired as non-regular workers, and tend to rotate between non-regular jobs (so-
called freeters). At the same time, the number of young people not in employment, education or 
training (so-called NEET) has also increased. Thus, the youngest generations are hit the hardest by 
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the restructuring and downsizing of Japanese corporations, and are to a certain extent not granted 
access to lifetime employment guarantees and job security. Throughout the prolonged recession of 
the 1990s, it seems that the main priority of Japanese corporations has been to maintain lifetime 
employment and job stability for the core of labour market segments (especially male middle-aged 
workers). Downsizing and restructuring has instead resulted in increasing fluctuation at the margins 
(or peripheries) of the labour market, especially among young persons and women in non-regular 
employment. This implies a stronger bifurcation of the labour market with increasing social and 
economic disparities.  
 
The need to adjust to the economic downturn has pushed the traditional Japanese flexicurity combi-
nation between internal flexibility and internal job security (and the benefits related to this) toward 
more (internal) flexibility in the effort to live up to the expectations of job security, avoiding dis-
missals of core workers. But the general need for labour adjustment to handle the prolonged reces-
sion has also involved a much stronger use of external flexibility measures creating unemployment 
and increasing use of non-regular workers. This more unbalanced combination of flexibility and 
security (especially external flexibility without or with limited external security) has resulted in an 
increasing feeling of job insecurity, even among core (regular) workers. Japanese workers have one 
of the world’s highest feelings of job insecurity, despite the continued commitment of Japanese 
employers to provide lifetime employment and job security. 
 
In recent years, there have been signs of improvements on the Japanese labour market; economic 
growth picking up, slightly decreasing unemployment rates, more new job openings, more gradu-
ates become regularly employed after completion of education, and a possible stagnation in the 
proportion of non-regular workers. However, there are a number of structural challenges confront-
ing the Japanese labour market which would make a full-scale return to the traditional balance be-
tween internal flexibilities and securities unlikely. First, the labour force structure is changing dras-
tically because of increased longevity and declining birth rates (fewer younger and more aged 
workers). The predicted labour shortages will compel Japanese employers to utilize more young, 
women and older workers, who have not fully participated in the labour market so far. Especially 
women and older workers will probably prefer more diversified and flexible work patterns to recon-
cile work and family life rather than traditional lifetime employment. Younger workers also seem to 
have a less negative attitude towards changing jobs on the external labour market than older genera-
tions. Second, Japanese industries are facing intensified global competition on the world market. 
This will probably lead to an era of slower economic growth, and constant needs to restructure, 
rationalize and downsize corporations. The traditional job security and lifetime employment will be 
increasingly difficult to maintain under such external conditions of intensified competition and slow 
economic growth. However, this does not imply a definitive departure from the core elements of the 
traditional combination of internal flexibility and job security, but rather the need to modify some 
elements of the Japanese employment system in order to maintain the unique qualities of internal 
labour markets and lifetime employment.  
 
5.1. Policy options on a new balance between flexibility and security 
 
From this starting point there are at least three different paths towards labour market reforms in 
Japan: Unprotected mobility, normalisation of non-regular work, and protected mobility. 
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Unprotected mobility: To keep up the existing flexicurity balance for core workers at the internal 
labour market and respond to the pressure on the internal flexibility, as well as the need for external 
flexibility, one option is to make it even easier to make numerical adjustments by using non-regular 
workers. Deregulation would then be the answer. Since the 1980s deregulation has been given high 
political priority in Japan to open up its domestic market for foreign competition. This deregulation 
drive also spilled over to labour law and employment reforms. Japan’s inactive external labour 
market and labour laws were blamed for hindering structural reforms and restructuring of compa-
nies (Araki 2002: 221). Deregulation would imply to make it easier to hire and fire non-regular 
workers (part-time workers, fixed-term workers and dispatch workers). The level of protection for 
temporary workers is, nonetheless, already in the lower half of OECD countries, so there might not 
be much need for further deregulation. In any case, further deregulation would result in an even 
more unbalanced and dual labour market between insiders (core workers) with strong job protection 
and outsiders (periphery workers) with unregulated working conditions and insufficient job and 
income protection. This structural imbalance would disproportionally affect young people, women 
and older workers, and might discourage them from increasing their participation and employment 
rates. In terms of flexicurity, the traditional Japanese flexicurity balance for the core segment on the 
labour market might be maintained, but the increasing numbers of non-regular workers and unem-
ployed persons would only experience flexibility and no (or low) security. As mentioned earlier, the 
main message of the European literature on flexicurity is that flexibility and security are mutually 
supportive; in casu, income, job and employment security are necessary preconditions for a well-
functioning and flexible labour market for non-regular workers with possibilities for transitions into 
regular employment.  
 
Normalisation of non-regular work: The second option is to rebalance flexibility and security for 
non-regular workers by increasing their job security, income security and employment security. Let 
us recall the Dutch approach to flexicurity. Not unlike the current Japanese situation, the Nether-
lands in the mid-1990s had developed a segmented labour market divided between regular workers 
with high job protection, and an insecure labour market for atypical workers performing external 
numerical flexibility. The idea of the Dutch flexicurity legislation, which took effect in 1999, was 
primarily targeted at giving job protection for atypical employees (among other things by setting a 
maximum period for temp work contracts). Another important aim was to encourage a development 
from job security towards employment security, in particular through a more active labour market 
policy. At the same time the protection against dismissal for permanent workers was modified. In 
the Japanese case, this would imply enhancing the security of the non-regular workers, and thereby 
combine the existing flexibility for these groups outside the core labour market with new types of 
(external) securities. Such a flexicurity balance would serve as the precondition for making better 
opportunities for transition from non-regular into regular work, and turn around the tendency of 
increasing economic disparities in Japanese society.  The challenge is the creation of two kinds of 
flexicurity; respectively for the internal labour market (with job-security and internal flexibility) and 
the external labour market (with numerical external flexibility and external employment and income 
security). While it is possible to enhance the income security of non-regular workers, it is more 
difficult to secure employment if the external labour market only serves as “buffer” for the core 
labour market, and if there are a low number of transitions between non-regular and regular em-
ployment status. If that is to be achieved, we are moving towards the third option transforming the 
job security and internal flexibility towards a model with higher numerical flexibility and income- 
and employment security; that is protected mobility. 
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(3) Protected mobility: The third approach to labour market reform requires a rebalancing of tradi-
tional flexibility and security in Japan, and a systematic activation of the external labour market. 
The inspiration can be found in the Danish approach to flexicurity by combining a more mobile 
labour market for core (regular) workers with an extensive active labour market policy for people in 
transition between jobs, and income security for non-regular as well as regular workers. We are 
well aware of the difficulties in whole-scale export of the Danish approach to flexicurity. For Japan, 
the main problem in learning from the Danish case of flexicurity is the complexities involved in 
moving from one configuration of levels of flexibility and security to another. This will typically 
involve one of the parties (especially core regular workers) accepting some form of increased flexi-
bility (and thus uncertainty) in their working life in order to receive compensation in the form of 
improved security provided by employers or the government (especially employment security and 
income security). For the regular employees this obviously implies the risk of being hijacked by 
accepting more flexibility, without gaining the reward in the form of increased (employment and 
income) security. Mutual trust created by historical experiences with bargaining processes and 
maybe supported by some form of government guarantee seems necessary. Likewise, higher public 
spending on income security or policies providing more employment security might be hampered 
by fear of increasing deficits on the public budgets. Such worries may be countered by pointing to 
the fact that this public spending are investments that will be repaid through the longer term growth 
stimuli from a more flexible labour market. The composition of labour market expenditures could 
also be shifted from providing subsidies for job maintenance towards active labour market policies 
aiming at reintegrating the unemployed (including public vocational training system, individualised 
counselling and reintegration plans, and wage subsidy schemes for unemployed). The objective of 
this would ultimately be to improve the functioning of the external labour market, and create a 
smoother transition from unemployment to employment, which would also benefit non-regular 
workers (especially women and younger people).  
 
One important, albeit rather general, lesson to learn from the Danish case of flexicurity is evidently 
that a sizeable welfare state with high levels of both taxes and social benefits is not incompatible 
with a dynamic and well-functioning labour market. The high degree of flexibility on the Danish 
labour market is thus supported indirectly through a number of welfare state services, which could 
serve as inspiration for welfare reforms in Japan:  
 
• Adequate and public child care systems: A well-developed system of childcare is indispensable 
for creating security for working parents and thus for a flexible supply especially of younger 
women on the labour market. 
• Building public vocational training systems: A comprehensive public system for adult education 
and training will make it easier to develop flexicurity arrangements, which involves employ-
ment security in the upgrading of skills of unemployed workers or workers at risk of unem-
ployment. Public vocational training system provides transferable rather than firm-specific skills 
and competencies for both unemployed and employed persons, which will improve the func-
tioning of the external labour market, and ensure a constant re-qualification of the workforce in 
the light of intensified global competition on the unskilled and labour-intensive parts of the la-
bour market.  
• Improving income and social security systems: Social security is a precondition of job mobility 
on the external labour market. High income replacement for unemployment increases the risk-
willingness of workers, and tends to increase job mobility on the labour market.   
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In a labour market perspective, these welfare schemes and services can be viewed as investments in 
well-functioning structures, rather than costs. These general lessons of the Danish case of flexicu-
rity might be used – not as a blueprint – but as inspiration and guiding principles for current welfare 
and labour market reforms in Japan. The main objective of such reforms would be to identify a 
more efficient and equitable combination of flexibility and security, where high-quality and secure 
transitions in and out of the external labour market complements the productivity and competitive-
ness of Japanese enterprises. 
 
 
 40 
References 
 
Andersen, S. K. and M. Mailand (2005) The Danish Flexicurity Model: The Role of the Collective 
Bargaining system, Copenhagen: Employment Relations Research Centre (FAOS). 
 
Aoki, M. (1990): Towards an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1-27. 
 
Araki, T. (2002): Labour and Employment Law in Japan, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour. 
 
Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd (2004): Jobomsætning på arbejdsmarkedet, (Mikkel Baadsgaard). 
 
Auer, P. (2000) Employment revival in Europe. Labour market success in Austria, Denmark, Ire-
land and the Netherlands, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Auer, P. and S. Cazes (eds.) (2003) Employment stability in an age of flexibility. Evidence from 
industrialized countries, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Auer, P. (2006): In Search of Optimal Labour Market Institutions – The Relationship between Sta-
bility, Flexibility and Security in Labour Markets, Background paper for keynote speech at 
CARMA Aalborg conference on Flexicurity and Beyond, October 11-14, 2006. 
 
Barbier, J.C. (2006): “Social Europe and the Limits of Soft Law, the example of Flexicurity”, Chap-
ter in R. Rogowski, ed. The European Social Model and Transitional Labour Markets: Law and 
Policy, Ashgate (forthcoming). 
 
Bingley, P., T. Eriksson, A. Werwatz and N. Westergaard-Nielsen (2000) ‘Beyond “Manucentrism” 
– Some fresh facts about job and worker flows’, Working Paper 99-09, Centre for Labour Market 
and Social Research, Aarhus University. 
 
Boyer, R. (2006): Employment and Decent Work in the Era of ‘Flexicurity’, DESA Working Paper 
No. 32. 
 
Bredgaard, T. & F. Larsen (2006): The Transitional Danish Labour Market: Understanding a Best 
Case, and Policy Proposals for Solving Some Paradoxes, Aalborg: CARMA Research Paper 2006:2. 
 
Bredgaard, T. & F. Larsen (2005)), eds. Employment Policy from Different Angles, Copenhagen: 
DJØF Publishing. 
 
Bredgaard. T., F. Larsen & P.K. Madsen (2006): Opportunities and Challenges for Flexicurity – 
The Danish Example, Transfer, Vol. 12, No. 1, spring 2006, pp. 61-83. 
 
Bredgaard, T., F. Larsen & P.K. Madsen (2005): The Flexible Danish Labour Market – A Review, 
Aalborg: CARMA Research Paper 2005:01. 
  
Campbell, J. L. and O. K. Pedersen (2005) ‘Danish institutional competitiveness in the global econ-
omy’, Working Paper, May 2005, prepared for the Danish Funktionærernes og Tjenestemændenes 
Fællesråd.  
 
 41 
Council of the European Union (2006): Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 23/24 
march (dated Brussels, 18 may 2006). 
 
Cox, R.H. (1998): From Safety Net to Trampoline: Labour Market Activation in the Netherlands 
and Denmark, Governance, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 397-415. 
 
Dolowitz, D. P. and D. Marsh (2000) ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Con-
temporary Policy-Making’, Governance 13 (1), 5-24. 
 
Dore, R. (1996): The End of Jobs for Life? Corporate Employment Systems: Japan and Elsewhere, 
Centre for Economic Performance, occasional paper no. 11, March 1996, London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science.  
 
Egger, P. and W. Sengenberger (2003) Decent work in Denmark. Employment, social efficiency and 
economic security, ILO, Geneva. 
 
European Foundation (2006): Mobility in Europe – Analysis of the 2005 Eurobarometer survey on 
geographical and labour market mobility, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the Euro-
pean Communities. 
 
Eurostat (2005) ‘Lifelong learning in Europe’, Statistics in focus, Populations and Social conditions, 
8/2005. 
 
Ferrera, M., A. Hemerijck & M. Rhodes (2001): ‘The future of social Europe: Recasting work and 
welfare in the new economy’, pp. 114-133, A. Giddens, ed. The Global third Way Debate, Cam-
bridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hall, P. A. and D. Soskice (2001) (eds.) Varieties of Capitalism – The institutional foundations of 
comparative advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
ILO (2005): World Employment Report 2004-05: Employment, Productivity and Poverty Reduction, 
Geneva: ILO. 
 
Jacobsson, K. (2004) ‘Soft regulation and the subtle transformation of states: the case of EU em-
ployment policy’, Journal of European Social Policy, 14 (4), 355-370. 
 
Japan Labour Review (2006): Special Edition: Current Situation of Work Hours and Vacations in 
Japan, Vol. 3, No. 3. 
 
JILPT (2003): Survey on Corporate Human Resource Management and Workers attitude Towards 
Work. Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labour. 
 
JILPT (2005): Signs of a Favourable Reappraisal of Japanese-style Employment Practices, Japan 
Labour Flash, No. 37. 
 
JILPT (2006): Labour situation in Japan and analysis: General overview 2006/2007, Tokyo: Japan 
Institute for Labour Policy and Training. 
 
 42 
Jørgensen, H. (2002) Consensus, cooperation and conflict – The policy-making process in Denmark, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Kato, T. (2001): The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?: Evidence from National Surveys and 
Field Research, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 15, pp. 489-514.  
 
Kazuo, Y. (2004): The State and Change in “Lifetime Employment” in Japan: From the End of the 
War through 1995, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, Research-Review, 2004/11. 
 
Klammer, U. & K. Tillman (2001), eds. Flexicurity – Soziale Sicherung und Flexibilisierung der 
Arbeits- und Lebensverhältnisse, Düsseldorf: WSI-Hans Böckler Stiftung.  
 
Larsen, F (2005) ‘Active Labour Market Policy in Denmark as an example of Transitional Labour 
Market and flexicurity arrangements – What can be learnt?’ in T. Bredgaard and F. Larsen (eds.) 
Employment policy from different angles, Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 115-134. 
 
Lassen, M. (2002) ‘Educational policies’, in H. Jørgensen Consensus, cooperation and conflict – 
The policy-making process in Denmark, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 190-209. 
 
Leschke, J., G. Schmid & D. Griga (2006): On the Marriage of Flexibility and Security: Lessons 
from the Hartz-reforms in Germany, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, Discussion Paper 2006-108.   
 
Madsen, P. K. (1999) ‘Denmark: Flexibility, security and labour market success’, Employment and 
Training Papers No 53, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Madsen, P. K. (2003) ‘‘‘Flexicurity’’ through labour market policies and institutions in Denmark’, 
in P. Auer and S. Cazes (eds.) Employment stability in an age of flexibility. Evidence from industri-
alized countries, Geneva: ILO, 59-105. 
 
Madsen, P. K. (2004) ‘The Danish model of ‘‘flexicurity”: experiences and lessons’, Transfer, 10 
(2), 187-207. 
 
Madsen, P. K. (2005) ‘The Danish road to flexicurity: Where are we. And how did we get there?’, 
in T. Bredgaard and F. Larsen (eds.) Employment policy from different angles, Copenhagen: DJØF 
Publishing. 
 
Madsen, P. K. (2006) ‘How can it possibly fly? The paradox of a dynamic labour market in a Scan-
dinavian welfare state’, in J. L. Campbell, J. A. Hall and O. K. Pedersen (eds.) National Identity and 
a Variety of Capitalism: The Case of Denmark, Montreal: McGill University Press, 321-355.  
 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2005): White Paper on the Labour Economy, Tokyo: 
MHLW.  
 
Ministry of Employment (2005): Større jobskabelser og jobnedlæggelser i Danmark, 1980-2002, 
Analysepapir 1, serviceeftersyn, Flere i arbejde, Copenhagen: Beskæftigelsesministeriet. 
 
Mira d’Ercole, M. (2006): Income Inequality and Poverty in OECD countries: How does Japan 
Compare?, The Japanese Journal of Social Security Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1.  
 43 
 
OECD (1997) Employment Outlook 1997, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2004) Employment Outlook 2004, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2005a) Employment Outlook 2005, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2005b) Education at a glance 2005, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2005c): OECD Economic Surveys: Japan, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2006): Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD. 
 
OECD (2006): Tax-Benefit Models (see www.oecd.org).  
 
Ogura, K. (2006): Contemporary working time in Japan- Legal system and reality, Japan Labour 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 5-23. 
 
Olsen, J. P. (2001) ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, ARENA Working Papers 01/2. 
 
Ono, H. (2006): Lifetime Employment in Japan: Concepts and Measurements, SSE/EFI Working 
Paper Series in Economics and Finance, No. 624, march 2006. 
 
Ozaki, M, (1999), ed.: Negotiating flexibility. The role of the social partners and the state, Geneva: 
ILO. 
 
Passet, O. (2003): Stability and Change: Japan’s employment system under pressure, pp. 159-218, P. 
Auer & S. Cazes, eds. Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility – Evidence from Industrialised 
Countries, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Schmid, G. and B. Gazier (2002) The dynamics of full employment: Social integration through 
transitional labour markets, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Schmid, G., & K. Schömann (2004): Managing Social Risks Through Transitional Labour Markets: 
Towards a European Social Model (TLM.NET Report No. 2004-01). Amsterdam: SISWO/Institute 
for the Social Sciences. 
 
Schmidt, V. (2002) ‘Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment’, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 9 (6), 894-912. 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2005) ‘Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Denmark as best place 
to do business’, Press release, 30 March 2005. 
 
Torfing, J. (2004) Det stille sporskifte i velfærdsstaten – en diskursteoretisk 
beslutningsprocesanalyse, Aarhus: Magtudredningen. 
 
Welfare Commission (2006): Fremtidens Velfærd – Vores Valg, Copenhagen: 
Velfærdskommissionen. 
 44 
 
Wilthagen, T (1998) ‘Flexicurity – A new paradigm for labour market policy reform?’, Berlin: 
WZB Discussion Paper, FSI, 98-202. 
 
Wilthagen, T. (2005) ‘Striking a balance? Flexibility and Security in European Labour Markets’, in 
T. Bredgaard and F. Larsen (eds.) Employment policy from different angles, Copenhagen: DJØF 
Publishing, 253-269. 
 
Wilthagen, T. & R. Rogowski (2002): Legal regulation of transitional labour markets, pp. 233-273, 
G. Schmid & B. Gazier, eds. The dynamics of full employment: Social integration through Transi-
tional Labour Markets, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Wilthagen, T. and F. Tros (2004) ‘The concept of ‘‘flexicurity”: A new approach to regulating em-
ployment and labour markets’, Transfer, 10 (2), 166-187.  
  
World Economic Forum (2005) Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, World Economic Fo-
rum. 
 
Yuji, G. (2001): A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New Reality Facing Japanese Youth, To-
kyo: I-House Press. 
 
